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LEGAL AID AND THE INDIGENT ACCUSED IN SOUTH
AFRICA: A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Lynn Berat*
"If legal aid is to give rise to the State having to guarantee to the
skolly element who loaf about, snatch handbags, steal purses and
remove money from people's pockets, the additional security of
being defended free of charge by legal practitioners provided by the
authorities when they appear in court, I can say even at this early
stage that the writing is on the wall. I want to put it very clearly
that I shall never be a party to subsidizing crime." I
Pieter C. Pelser
South African Minister of Justice
February 26, 1969
INTRODUCTION
An unrepresented accused faces a greater chance of conviction than
a represented accused. Such an individual, unfamiliar with the rules
of procedure and evidence and courtroom practices in general, may
be frightened, inarticulate, and unable to comprehend what is oc-
curring. Compounding the situation in South Africa is the fact that
most of the accused are Africans and Coloureds, classes often sub-
jected to discriminatory practices. 2 The Africans frequently are unable
to speak either English or Afrikaans, the languages of the court.
Various South Africaft studies confirm the impact of legal repre-
sentation on the outcome of an accused's case. Of 400 cases heard
* Ph.D. Yale; J.D. Texas. Member of the Texas Bar. The author, a former
Research Associate at the Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of the
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, is a Postdoctoral Fellow and the Assistant Admin-
istrator of the Mid-Career Development Program for Black South Africans at Yale;
she is also a consultant to the Ford Foundation on South African issues.
' Pieter Pelser, South African Minister of Justice, quoted in REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA, HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES (HANSARD), Feb. 26, 1969, at col. 1496.
2 Under the apartheid system, the South African government classifies people
as white, African, Coloured (i.e. people of mixed descent), and Asian. This ter-
minology is also employed in this article. The word "black" will be used to denote
all South Africans who are not members of the white group. Of South Africa's 28
million people, 71.90o7 are African, 2.8076 are Asian, 9.207o are Coloured, and 16.107o
are white. L. THOMPSON & A. PRIOR, SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS 35 (1982).
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at the Retreat Regional Magistrate's Court3 from September 30, 1979
to October 1, 1980, 35.5% of the represented accused, as compared
with 10% of the unrepresented accused, received acquittals.4 A similar
pattern emerges in juvenile cases. A 1974 survey of juvenile offenders
revealed a 33% acquittal rate for represented accused and a 15%
acquittal rate for unrepresented accused.' Of the 100 juvenile cases
heard at the Umlazi Magistrate's Court from June 16, 1980 to October
3, 1980, acquittal rates ran at 50% for represented accused and 20.7%
for unrepresented accused. 6 Of 500 juvenile cases heard in the Durban
Magistrate's Court from July 27, 1980 to February 12, 1981, 30o
3 The regional magistrates' courts are lower courts which hear serious criminal
cases including rape and robbery. They may impose sentences of up to ten years
imprisonment. The other type of lower courts are district courts. Their criminal
jurisdiction extends to minor criminal matters only. The regional magistrates' courts
and the district courts are known collectively as magistrates' courts. The presiding
magistrates are civil servants in the Department of Justice. Appeals from these lower
courts lie in the Provincial and Local Divisions of the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court has seven Provincial Divisions and three Local Divisions. In addition to their
appellate function, these courts have original jurisdiction in criminal matters pun-
ishable by more than ten years imprisonment or by death. The State President-in-
Council (the Cabinet) appoints the Divisional judges, and jurisdiction extends to all
causes of action affecting all individuals within their respective provinces or local
areas. Appeals from Provincial and Local Divisions lie in the Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court, South Africa's highest court. The Appellate Division lacks
original jurisdiction and is composed of a Chief Justice and ten appeals judges. For
further discussion of the South African court structure, see H. HAHLO & E. KAHN,
THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LAWS AND CONSTITUTION
249 (1960); W. HOSTEN, A. EDWARDS, C. NATHAN, & F. BOSMAN, INTRODUCTION
TO SOUTH AFRICAN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY (1980) [hereinafter SOUTH AFRICAN
LAW].
The South African legal profession is divided into attorneys and advocates. The
two differ in six ways. First, only advocates have the right of audience in the Supreme
Court. Second, Supreme Court judges are appointed from the ranks of advocates.
Third, only attorneys may do certain work, e.g. initiate litigation in the courts.
Fourth, statutes govern various aspects of attorneys' practice (e.g. practical training,
admission and removal from the rolls) to a much greater degree than they govern
advocates' practice. Fifth, academic qualifications and practical training required
for admission as an advocate or attorney differ. Sixth, the ethical rules for attorneys
and advocates differ in some respects.
4 M. SLABBERT, SOUTH AFRICA'S LEGAL SYSTEM: JUSTICE FOR ALL? 30 (1981).
These figures represent the average percentage of acquittal for all those appearing
regardless of race. Since Africans and Coloureds are represented in fewer instances
than whites, the acquittal rate for these groups will likely be lower than 35.5%. See
infra note 11 and accompanying text.
IMidgley, Sentencing in the Juvenile Court, 91 S. AFR. L. J. 451, 457 (1974).
6 Hutchinson, Juvenile Justice: A Study in Durban and Umlazi, 3 NATAL U. L.
REV. 510, 544 (1980-81).
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of represented accused, as compared with 12.4%70 of the unrepresented
accused, received acquittals. 7
Despite the importance of legal representation, each year some one
million accused are without assistance in the magistrates' courts.8 Of
these, approximately 180,000 receive prison terms. 9 Tragically, the
vast majority of the unrepresented accused are poor Africans and
Coloureds who together comprise 90% of those charged with criminal
offenses10 in South Africa each year and 900%0 of the prison popu-
lation."1
South Africa's recognition of a right to counsel in criminal cases 2
has little value in a country where the vast majority of people cannot
afford legal representation; 3 nevertheless, this right provides a foun-
dation for constructing a system of legal aid designed to ensure some
equality of representation between rich and poor alike.14 Historically,
the South African government has shown an anti-legal aid bias. 15 As
a result, the national legal aid system is underfinanced, underpub-
licized and underutilized, resulting in ineffective assistance to the
indigent. 16 It is especially ineffective in criminal cases where, because
an accused risks losing his liberty or his life, the need for qualified
assistance is greatest. Thus, for example, while criminal cases comprise
7 Id. at 543.
D. MCQUOID-MASON, AN OUTLINE OF LEGAL AD IN SOUTH AFRICA 10 (1982).
In the Supreme Court, however, most accused appear to have representation. A
study of 144 robbery cases in the Durban and Coastal Local Division showed that
94% of the accused had representation. Id. at 99.
I Id. at 100.
,0 Id. at 99.
I d. Statistics reveal that at least 80%7o of African and Coloured sentenced
prisoners had no legal representation at their trials. Id. at 99-100. Thus, for example,
a survey of 425 cases heard at the Cape Town Magistrate's Court from January 1,
1980 to July 31, 1980, disclosed that 84.5% of the African and 79% of the Coloured
accused had no representation while only 42% of the white accused went unrepre-
sented. M. SLABBERT, supra note 4, at 28-29. Similarly, of 400 cases heard at the
criminal sessions in the Retreat Regional Magistrate's Court from September 30,
1979 to October 1, 1980, 99.9% of the Africans and 92.3% of the Coloureds had
no legal representation while 72.3% of whites went without assistance. Id. at 29.
,2 See infra notes 31-74 and accompanying text.
,1 See infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 300-31 and accompanying text. Legal aid may be defined as
the gratuitous rendering of legal assistance to individuals who cannot afford to pay
for legal services.
11 See infra notes 75-119 and accompanying text. See also supra note 1 and
accompanying text (quotation from former South African Minister of Justice).
16 See infra notes 220-74 and accompanying text.
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approximately 10%70 of all legal aid applications, 7 the system provides
aid to under 1076 of the accused persons who are sentenced to im-
prisonment in the Magistrates' Court each year. 8 While various in-
dependent organizations also supply legal aid to the indigent accused,
this assistance does little to remedy the situation. 9
This article examines the history and present state of legal aid in
South Africa. Special reference is given to the plight of the indigent
accused, and suggestions are included for reforms aimed at equalizing
legal representation among the accused, regardless of wealth or race.
Part I discusses the right to counsel, without which there can be no
system of legal aid. Part II considers the history of legal aid through
1969. Part III describes and critiques the current national system of
legal aid dating from 1969, as well as the operations of the various
independent legal aid organizations. Part IV proposes ways in which
the entire system (state-funded and independent) can be reformed to
accommodate a greater number of persons.
I. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. Historical Antecedents: The Roman, Roman-Dutch, and
English Positions
Under Roman law, the praetor or the governor assigned an advocate
in proceedings to represent minors, physically or mentally retarded
individuals, and those unable to procure assistance because of their
adversary's influence.20 Since such an appointment represented a pub-
lic duty, it was unethical for the appointed counsel to accept re-
muneration. 2' In addition, improper action or failure to appear resulted
in disbarment of the appointed counsel. 22 The assistance of the in-
digent, however, was only an incidental result of a system designed
to maintain patronage networks.
Roman-Dutch law, conversely, exhibited an acceptance of the policy
of providing aid to the indigent accused. During the thirteenth century,
,7 D. MCQUOID-MASON, supra note 8, at I 11.
Id. at 100.
" See infra notes 275-99 and accompanying text.
20 DIG. JUST. 1.16.9.5; DIG. JUST. 3.1.1.4. The modern view holds that South
African law represents a hybrid legal system of Roman, Roman-Dutch, and English
law. Zajtay and Hosten, The Permanence of Roman Law in the Continental System
and South African Law, CoMP. & INT'L L. J. S. AFR. 181, 197 (1969).
21 SOUTH AFRICAN LAW, supra note 3, at 826.
22 CODE JUST. 2.6.7.
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advocates known as taelmannen were attached to the courts in the
Netherlands. 23 Judges appointed them to act at the defendant's re-
quest. Thus, "the origin of the court assigning an advocate to a
pauper defendant is probably due to the fact that the taelman was
appointed by the judge at the request of the client." ' 24 Roman-Dutch
law modified the Roman practice of assigning counsel based on the
accused's lack of political influence by allocating counsel only in the
case of poverty. 25 This shift reflected a change in the basis upon
which such assistance rested; while Roman laws stressed the need to
avoid political imbalance, medieval law based the allocation of counsel
to indigents on the idea of charity. 26
In England, as in the Netherlands, the idea of charity held sway.
For example, the law provided that ecclesiastical lawyers, otherwise
legally barred from appearing in secular courts, could do so on behalf
of the indigent accused. 27 Yet the prevailing belief that the chance
of conviction should rise with the seriousness of the offense allowed
indigent representation in misdemeanor, but not felony, cases. 28 This
theory persisted until 1836 when a right to counsel in all cases became
standard.29 However, the emergence of a general right to counsel in
criminal cases did not imply that there existed a right to counsel for
indigents;30 in practice, the right was empty with regard to the indigent
accused. This is the situation that exists in South Africa today.
B. The South African Position
The granting of legal aid depends upon the accused's having a
right to counsel. In South Africa, the right to counsel is a common
law right 3' frequently reaffirmed through legislation.32 The post-Union
23 J. WESSELS, HISTORY OF THE ROMAN-DUTCH LAW 193 (1908) (citing the nine-
teenth century French jurist Raepsaet).
24 Id. at 194.
23 J. VOET, THE SELECTIVE VOET, BEING THE COMMENTARY ON THE PANDECTS OF
JOHANNES VOET, Book I, Title 1, § 11 (1955).
26 See Cappelletti & Gordley, Legal Aid: Modern Themes and Variations, 24
STAN. L. REV. 347, 351-54 (1972).
27 Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARv. L. REV. 361, 365 (1923).
21 See Selikowitz, Defence by Counsel in Criminal Proceedings Under South
African Law, ACTA JURIDICA 53, 56, 61-62 (1965-66).
29 Id. at 61-62.
30 B. ABEL-SMITH & R. STEVENS, LAWYERS AND THE COURTS 32 (1967).
11 Brink v. Commissioner of Police, [1960] 3 S.A. 65 (T) 67; S. v. Wessels, [19661
4 S.A. 89 (C) 92; S. v. Heyman, [1966] 4 S.A. 598 (a) 604.
32 Legislation in the Cape, the Orange Free State, the Transvaal, and Natal
recognizes this right. The Cape codified this right at Cape Proc. of 1819 (crown
19881
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South African criminal codes of 1917,'3 1955, 34 and 197715 recognize
this right. In recent years, however, legislation dealing with state
security 6 and drug abuse 7 has limited this right. Persons arrested
pursuant to the provisions of such legislation consequently have no
access to counsel until they either are charged or are brought to court
as witnesses.3"
trial) § 65 (providing the right to counsel after preparatory examination) and Cape
Ord., No. 40 of 1828 (criminal procedure) § 38 (providing the right to counsel after
committal for trial). Section 39 of the 1828 Ordinance denied the right to counsel
in preparatory examinations, but Section 13 of Cape Act 17 of 1874 repealed this
section. Cape Act No. 20 of 1856 (resident magistrates' courts) § 45 confirmed the
right to counsel (except in preparatory examinations) in the resident magistrates'
courts. See generally Selikowitz, supra note 28, at 65.
The Orange Free State's right to counsel is codified at Orange Free State (OFS)
Wetboek Van den Oranjevrijstaat of 1891, art. 45. Article 46 permitted legal assistance
during the preparatory examination. OFS Criminal Procedure Ordinance, No. 12 of
1902, art. 44, however, stipulated that a prisoner could not have legal assistance
before commitment for examination except with the magistrate's permission. See
generally Selikowitz, supra note 28, at 69.
In the Transvaal the South African Republic's (SAR) Thirty-Three Articles of
1844, art. 16 appeared to recognize a right to counsel. See G. EYBERS, SELECT
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATING SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY 1795-1910 353
(1918). SAR ord., No. 5 § 98 provided for the appointment of pro deo counsel in
the case of an indigent accused. This ordinance remained in effect (except from
March 1865 to January 1867) until 1903 when Transvaal Criminal Procedure Or-
dinance, No. 1 of 1903 § 168, replaced it with a general recognition of the right
to counsel. See generally Selikowitz, supra note 28, at 67.
The Natal legislation providing the right to counsel is Natal Ordinance, No. 18
of 1845 (criminal procedure) §§ 43-44 which copied Cape Ordinance, No. 40 of
1828 (criminal procedure) §§ 38-39. Natal Law, No. 16 of 1861 (administration of
criminal justice) § 4 provided for access to counsel but empowered the magistrate
to exclude all persons, including counsel, from the examination if he deemed it
necessary to the administration of justice. See generally Selikowitz, supra note 28,
at 65.
31 Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, No. 31 of 1917 §§ 97, 218. The Cape
Colony, Natal, the Orange Free State (later the Orange River Colony), and the
South African Republic (later the Transvaal) joined to form the Union of South
Africa in 1910. The Union later became a Republic in 1961. See generally L.
THOMPSON, THE UNIFICATION OF SOUTH AFRICA (1980).
14 Criminal Procedure Act, No. 56 of 1955 §§ 84, 158.
11 Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51 of 1977 §§ 73, 166.
36 Internal Security Act, No. 44 of 1950 § 12B (repeated in 1982); Gen. L.
Amendment Act 37 of 1963 § 17; Gen. L. Amendment Act 62 of 1966 § 22;
Terrorism Act 83 § 6; Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51 of 1977 § 185. See generally
J. DUGARD, SOUTH AFRICAN CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: INTRODUCTION TO
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1977).
17 ABUSE OF DEPENDENCE-PRODUCING SUBSTANCES AND REHABILITATION CENTRES
ACT, No. 41 of 1971 § 13.
38 Id.
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The courts traditionally have viewed the right to counsel as inherent
in the system of justice. 9 Hence, in the pre-Union case of Li Kui
Yu v. Superintendent of Labourers,4° the Transvaal court, held,
it is quite clear that the only way of preventing a person being
illegally done away with and illegally treated is to uphold to the
fullest extent the right of every person to have any of his friends
come and see him who choose to do so .... I think it was even
more serious still for him (the superintendent) to absolutely decline
to allow the man to consult a solicitor or even to say whether he
wished to see a solicitor.4 1
Post-Union cases echo the Li Kui Yu position regarding the right
to counsel. In Brink v. Commissioner of Police,42 the court noted
that "[iut is the fundamental right of every South African citizen
upon apprehension or arrest by the authorities to obtain legal advice
and consult with his legal advisers." ' 43 Moreover, the court found
that "[this right] . . . is so fundamental that it should be taken away
only if the regulations specifically say so or if the regulations say so
by necessary implication."44
Some case support also exists suggesting that the deprivation of
the right to counsel may constitute a miscarriage of justice . 5 In S.
v. Wessels,46 the Cape Court held that the denial of legal represen-
tation was an irregularity of a magnitude warranting a finding that
the accused had not received a proper trial. 47 After a detailed analysis
of the right to counsel in Roman-Dutch law, the court opined that
Roman-Dutch law had perceived the desirability of legal represen-
39 See Li Kui Yu v. Superintendent of Labourers [1906] T.S. 181, 188; R. v.
Slabbert, [1956] 4 S.A. 18 (T) 21; Brink v. Commissioner of Police [1960] 3 S.A.
65 (T) 67.
[1906] T.S. 181.
41 Id. at 188.
42 [1960] 3 S.A. 65 (T).
41 Id. at 67.
- Id. at 69. The regulations referred to were those promulgated in 1960 when
the South African government declared a state of emergency following the Sharpeville
shootings. For a discussion of the events surrounding the Sharpeville shootings, see
L. THOMPSON & A. PRIOR, supra note 2, at 196.
41 S. v. Blooms, [1966] 4 S.A. 417 (C) 421; S. v. Wessels, [1966] 4 S.A. 89 (C)
95; S. v. Seheri En Andere, [1964] 1 S.A. 29 (A); R. v. Mtetwe, [1957] 4. S.A.
298 (0) 99; R. v. Pandoi, [1955] 4 S.A. 128 (N) 131; Cf. S. v. Shabangu, [1976]
3 S.A. 555 (A).
[1966] 4 S.A. 89.
47 For a fuller discussion, see Dugard, The Right to Counsel: South African and
American Developments, 84 S. AFR. L. J. 1 (1967).
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tation and that legal assistance in both civil and criminal matters was
a well-established practice:
From the authorities it would ... appear that in all civil matters
and all procedural matters . . . whether the latter were related to
civil or criminal matters the parties before the court had the right
to seek audience through a legal representative. This is of course
in keeping with the attitude of the Superior Courts in Holland, that
a party could ofly be heard through a legal practitioner.
From the authorities . . . it can be seen that from at least before
the start of the seventeenth century . . . parties in civil matters and
third parties wishing to resist an order by the court to perform
some act in respect of a pending suit-civil or criminal-have had
the right to audience through legal practitioners, and that in all
serious criminal cases a similar right of audience has existed for
nearly 150 years.48
On this basis the Court held that:
The failure to allow audience through a legal practitioner to a person
who objects to giving evidence in a criminal trial is a gross irreg-
ularity. It is so gross a departure from established rules of procedure
that it can be said that the accused have not been properly tried.
It seems to me that any reasonable person hearing of what took
place would say the accused have not had justice.49
In addition, the Court maintained that:
Nothing is achieved by speculating whether the acumen and per-
suasiveness of the legal practitioners could rightly or wrongly have
persuaded the court a quo to come to a decision favorable to the
accused. The fact remains that the accused have been deprived of
the opportunity. It is not for this court to speculate on what would
have happened had the accused not been so deprived.50
The court subsequently affirmed the right of an accused to counsel
in S. v. Blooms,5 where it held that "[elvery accused at any criminal
trial has the right to be represented if he so desires, by a legal
practitioner. ' 52 In Blooms, the trial court advanced the trial date in
contravention of established procedures. This, the Court held, "ha[d]
deprived the applicant of his right to be legally represented at the
41 Wessels, 4. S.A. at 95-96.
49 Id.
So Id. at 97.
5 [1966] 4 S.A. 417 (C).
S2 Id. at 420.
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trial. The irregularity is of so gross a nature that it can be said that
the applicant was not properly tried and there has in consequence
been a failure of justice." 53
The courts have further held that it is a fatal irregularity to proceed
with a trial after the accused's counsel fails to appear and represent
him54 or to refuse to postpone a trial in order to allow an accused
to obtain legal representation. 5 Additionally, an individual's right to
legal representation implies that he must have an opportunity to
obtain a representative5 6 and that the latter have a right to address
the court on his client's behalf.17
Despite the foregoing, it appears that the right to counsel is not
absolute and a deprivation of the right may not per se constitute a
miscarriage of justice. In this vein, the English case of R. v. Howes59
suggested that "[t]he real question . . . is whether the court is com-
pletely satisfied that notwithstanding the unfortunate course the case
took in regard to the defendant not being represented, there has been
a miscarriage of justice." 6 The South African court adopted this
view in S. v. Nongila.6 1 In that case, after examining previous South
African decisions including those in the Wessels and Blooms cases,
the court maintained that "[i]n no case . . . has it been held that
the fact per se that an accused is denied legal representation affords
a ground for relief."' 62 Others suggest, however, that the right is
rather one of non-deprival and that the right to representation by
an advocate may depend upon the accused's ability to pay. 63
11 Id. at 421.
14 S. v. Naula, [1974] 1. S.A. 801 (E).
11 S. v. Nel, [1974] 2 S.A. 445 (NC).
56 S. v. Hertzog, [1970] 2 S.A. 445 (NC).
17 Cf. Ndanozonke v. Nel, [19711 3 S.A. 217 (E); S. v. Sitlu, [19711 2 S.A. 238
(N); S. v. Breakfast, [1970] 2 S.A. 611 (E).
1s S. v. Nongila, [1970] 3 S.A. 97, 99 (E); cf. S. v. Chaane, [1978] 2 S.A. 891,
895 (A).
59 [1964] 1 W.L.R. 576.
- Id. at 582.
6, [1970] 3 S.A. 97 (E).
62 Id. at 99.
63 Bamford, Service in the Gown, 87 S. AFR. L. J. 338, 342 (1970). This suggestion
comports with Dugard's view that the accused's right to representation "[i]n most
cases . . is simply the right of an accused person not to be deprived of legal
representation if he can afford it." Dugard, supra note 54, at 3 (emphasis in original).
There has been no South African decision paralleling those of the United States
Supreme court in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) and Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). In Gideon, the Court held that all persons accused of
1988]
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Although the right to counsel is not absolute in the sense that the
court must appoint counsel when the accused is unable to afford it,
there is, in practice, a long-standing custom of appointing pro deo
counsel to represent indigent accused in capital cases.64 In R. v. Mati, 65
the Appellate Division asserted that:
[I]t is well-established and most salutary practice that whenever there
is a risk that the death sentence may be imposed ... the State
should provide defence by counsel if the accused has not made his
own arrangements in that behalf. It is disquieting to think that
under our system of procedure, of which we are in general justly
proud, it is possible for an accused person to be convicted by a
Judge sitting alone and be sentenced to death after a trial in which,
by reason of his poverty, he has had to conduct his own defence. 66
The court insisted, however, that "there is no rule of law that a
person who is being tried for an offence that may, if he is convicted,
result in a death sentence must, unless he objects, be defended by
counsel." ' 67 The South African Department of Justice adopts this
a felony are entitled to counsel furnished by the state if the defendant cannot afford
a fee. The Argersinger decision extended the right to trials for lesser criminal offenses.
In Argersinger, the court declared that there is a duty upon the state to provide a
lawyer in all criminal cases where a jail sentence is possible. It noted that "[albsent
a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense
whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by
counsel at his trial." Id. at 37.
In criminal proceedings in England and Wales, the court may make a legal aid
order if it appears to be in the interests of justice and if a defendant qualifies for
financial assistance. The court must make an order if the defendant is committed
for trial on a murder charge or where the prosecutor appeals or applies for leave
to appeal from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) to the House of Lords.
No unrepresented accused may recieve a custodial sentence for the first time unless
he has had the opportunity to apply for legal aid. CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION,
JUSTICE AND THE LAW IN BRITAIN 120 (1985).
- Capital cases include murder, treason, kidnapping, child-stealing, rape, robbery,
attempted robbery, and housebreaking or attempted housebreaking where the court
finds aggravating circumstances. Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51 of 1977 § 277(19).
Political offenses punishable by death include sabotage, Gen. L. Amendment Act,
No. 76 of 1962 § 21, the encouragement by a South African resident abroad of
violent change in South Africa, the training of a South African resident abroad for
"furthering the achievement of any of the objects of Communism" or of any
unlawful organization, Internal Security Act, No. 44 of 1950 § 11 (repealed in 1982)
and participation in "terrorist activities," Terrorism Act, No. 83 of 1967 § 2 (repealed
in 1982).
61 [19601 1 S.A. 304 (AD).
Id. at 306-07.
67 Id. at 306.
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view, maintaining that in political trials, where the offence carries
the death penalty, a chief magistrate may, upon request, appoint
counsel to defend the accused at the state's expense. This, however,
does not amount to a recognition of a right to representation for
the indigent accused. 68 Scant judicial precedent exists to the effect
that failure to appoint counsel in capital cases is not a miscarriage
of justice. In S. v. Chaane en Andere,69 the court held that there
was no irregularity even though the trial court refused a request by
one of the accused for an opportunity to obtain counsel including
or alternatively pro deo counsel. The trial judge, however, was not
aware that he might impose the death sentence until after the accused's
conviction and admission of previous convictions. 70
Even in cases where the courts appoint pro deo counsel, the accused
often receives inferior assistance. Typically, junior counsel handle
these cases. 71 In addition, such counsel may not be prepared ade-
quately since courts rarely appoint attorneys pro deo to assist counsel.7 2
61 Dagbreek en Sondagnuus, July 31, 1966. The Secretary for Justice confirmed
this view in the Department of Justice Annual Report for 1965:
It must be clearly understood that no obligation rests on the State to ensure
that all indigent accused persons are defended by an advocate or attorney.
Not only is such a system not warranted, but it would also undermine the
administration of justice and would moreover be completely inconsistent
with the general judicial and social pattern in this country.
"UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FOR THE
CALENDAR YEAR 1965, at 5 (1966).
69 [1978] 2 S.A. 891 (A).
70 Id. at 895.
7' H. HAHLO & E. KAHN, supra note 3, at 290. The South African advocat6s
profession is divided into senior and junior counsel. Senior counsel are advocates
possessing letters patent. Before South Africa became a Republic, the Queen of
England issued letters patent. Since South Africa became a Republic, the State
President issues letters patent. The State President grants senior status to advocates
whose wide experience, extensive practice, and good character justify the grant. Cf.
Wellworths Bazaars Ltd. v. Chandlers Ltd., [1947] 4 S.A. 453, 461-62 (T). The
State President grants senior status only after the advocate makes an application
upon recommendation of the chairman of the bar council and the judge president
of the division of the supreme court where the advocate practices. Senior advocates
have the title SC (senior consultus) or QC (Queen's Consultus) if they received their
letters patent before South Africa became a Republic. Senior counsel wear silk gowns
and are called "silks," "seniors," or "leaders." They rank in seniority according
to the date of their letters patent.
All counsel who are not senior counsel are junior counsel. The term does not
refer to age. The seniority of junior counsel derives from the time the advocate was
first admitted to practice in South Africa or Namibia. Ex Parte Dold [1947] 3 S.A.
201 (N).
72 H. HAHLO & E. KAHN, supra note 3, at 290.
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This means that counsel themselves must investigate their clients'
cases. Often, they have neither the time nor the resources to perform
this task properly. 73 If the accused is free on bail, counsel usually is
able to consult with him only on the day of the trial. Even if the
accused is in custody and accessible, language barriers may make
communication difficult or impossible without an interpreter.
Neither the qualified right to counsel nor the pro deo rule in capital
cases constitutes an organized system for providing legal services to
the indigent accused. The former is a provision of the general law
which incidentally aids indigent accused7 4 while the latter is an in-
71 SCHOOL OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSAND, ANN. SURV. S. AFR. 2.
505 (1982).
14 There is one other provision of the general law which incidentally aids the
indigent accused. The Criminal Procedure Act's review proceedings provide for the
automatic review of sentences above a certain minimum imposed by magistrates'
courts in criminal cases. Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51 of 1977 §§ 302-06. Under
the Act, any sentence imposed upon an unrepresented accused by a magistrate's
court is subject to automatic review of a judge of the Provincial Division having
jurisdiction. This occurs in situations where the accused is sentenced to: 1) a period
of imprisonment exceeding three months or a fine exceeding R500, by a judicial
officer who has not held the substantive rank of magistrate or higher for a period
of seven years (§ 302(l)(a)9i-ii); or 2) a period of imprisonment exceeding six months
or a fine exceeding R1000, by a judicial officer who has held the substantive rank
of magistrate or higher for a period of seven years or longer, id.; or 3) a whipping
other than a whipping imposed upon a juvenile male. Criminal Procedure Act, No.
51 of 1977 (§ 302 (l)(a)(iii)). In cases where automatic review applies, the clerk of
the court must forward within one week a record of the proceedings to the registrar
together with any remarks by the presiding judicial officer and any written statement
or argument by the convicted individual submitted within three days of the sentence(§ 303). If the judge finds that the proceedings did not comport with the standards
of justice, he must obtain a statement of the reasons for conviction and sentence
from the presiding officer and place the statement and a record of the proceedings
before the court of the Provincial Division having jurisdiction sitting as a court of
appeal. Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51 of 1977 (§ 304 (2)(a)). A memorandum
from the members of the Transvaal Bench to their then Judge President emphasized
the importance of this system, the authority for which then derived from the
Magistrates' Courts Act rather than from the Criminal Procedure Act. It underscored
the problems of a general state of illiteracy of accused persons combined with the
fact that a vast majority of accused are undefended. Thus, the memorandum noted
that "[wihen it is borne in mind that at least 90 percent of the accused persons are
either wholly or partially illiterate and that the great majority of them are undefended,
the vital importance of the system in the administration of justice in this country
becomes apparent." 79 S. AFR. L. J. 267 (1962). However, this system has limitations
that curtail its usefulness. For example, the high court does not review all cases;
the Criminal Procedure Act specifically excludes proceedings in regional magistrates'
courts from review. Among cases that are reviewed it appears that under one percent
of reviews result in judgments being set aside, and under two percent lead to a
variation in the sentences. D. MCQUOID-MASON, supra note 8, at 66. Moreover,
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comprehensive measure designed to treat the gravest inequities in the
justice system. Both are, however, the bases upon which an all-
encompassing legal aid system can be founded.
II. THE HISTORY OF LEGAL AID To 1969
Members of the South African bench and bar have long called for
a comprehensive system of legal aid in criminal matters. As early as
1930, a note in the South African Law Journal on the English Poor
Prisoners' Defence Act suggested that it was "at least questionable
whether some legislation of this sort should not be introduced in this
country.1 75 In 1935, there came the first effort to establish an or-
ganized comprehensive legal aid scheme. On November 7 of that
year, the South African Institute of Race Relations, acting in con-
sultation with the Department of Justice and with the Incorporated
Law Society of the Transvaal, convened a conference on legal aid. 76
Since the majority of persons needing free legal assistance were Af-
ricans and Coloureds, the promotion of race relations provided some
of the inspiration behind the conference. 77 Some felt that particularly
in larger cities, organized legal aid bureaus offered the only manner
of achieving a modicum of equality between rich and poor before
the law. 71
The Conference resulted in the establishment of the first legal aid
bureau in Johannesburg ift 1937.79 With the need for assistance in
criminal matters being greater than that in civil matters, the Bureau
originally aided only indigent accused. By 1940, the need for advice
and assistance in civil matters became apparent, and the Bureau
expanded its activities. 0 Subsequently, bureaus opened in Cape Town,
review proceedings are not appeal proceedings. The appellate court can consider
only the legality of procedure in the trial court and cannot inquire into the merits
of the case. Id.
71 Note, Poor Prisoners' Defence Act, 47 S. AFR. L.J. 427 (1930).
76 Abramowitz, Legal Aid in South Africa, 77 S. AFR. L.J. 351, 353 (1960).
" Id. at 352-53; see also Rand Daily Mail, Apr. 29, 1947, at 10, col. 6 (remarks
of Mr. Justice Ramsbottom at annual meeting of Johannesburg Legal Aid Bureau).
11 Rand Daily Mail, Apr. 29, 1947, at 10, col. 6.
71 Abramowitz, supra note 76, at 353. At the time, the Senior Magistrate of
Johannesburg lent much support to the move. Cook, A History of Legal Aid in
South Africa, in LEGAL AID IN SOUTH AFRICA 28, 30 (Faculty of Law, University
of Natal 1974).
80 Cook, supra note 79, at 30. In its first years, the work of the Bureau focused
on representation of accused in Magistrates' Court. In 1941, the South African
Institute of Race Relations opened a second legal aid bureau, this time in Cape
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Durban, Bloemfontein, Pietermaritzburg, East London, and Port
Elizabeth. Due to the independent, voluntary nature of these bureaus,
however, the service never approached nation-wide dimensions. Thus,
aid remained nonexistent in rural areas.
Financial difficulties and questions about their control plagued the
Bureaus almost from their inception. In 1943, the Minister of Social
Welfare convened a conference to examine the control of legal aid.8
Delegates attended from various bodies including the Departments
of Social Welfare and Justice, the Provincial Law Societies, the
Central Committee for Legal Aid, and the South African Institute
of Race Relations.12 Many opposed any type of state control of legal
aid on the grounds that the success of the Bureaus was derived from
public knowledge of their independence. 83 They argued that state
control would render the Bureaus governmental departments. This
would result, because of the social problems of South African society,
in fewer individuals approaching the Bureaus for advice. In addition,
because many prospective clients' difficulties involved government
departments, the potential for intergovernmental conflict could lessen
the availability of legal aid. Finally, since the Bureaus were functioning
well, a perception existed that more financial support was all that
was required. Responding to these concerns, the delegates suggested
that any control should be exercised by a body comprised of state
representatives, members of the legal profession, and laymen.8 4
Following a second conference in 1944,85 the Minister of Justice
announced a plan giving the Provincial Law Societies responsibility
for establishing legal aid bureaus in their respective provinces. 86 The
plan placed control with local committees comprised of representatives
Town. Abramowitz, supra note 76, at 354. Like its Johannesburg counterpart, it
too dealt first with criminal cases and later expanded its services to include civil
matters in 1942. Cape Argus, July 7, 1948. Next, a legal aid bureau opened in
Pretoria in May 1943. Rand Daily Mail, June 21, 1984. By June it had thirty-five
clients of whom twenty-five were African.
11 Abramowitz, supra note 76, at 354.
82 Rand Daily Mail, Nov. 17, 1943, at 4, col. 2.
11 When the Conference occurred, reports of widespread opposition to state control
of legal aid appeared in the press. Cape Times, June 19, 1959.
14 Rand Daily Mail, Nov. 17, 1943, at 4, col. 2. There remains some uncertainty
as to what occurred at the Conference as some delegates from the Bar Councils,
the South African Institute for Race Relations, and the Central Legal Aid Committee
disputed the official version of the proceedings. Rand Daily Mail, Nov. 18, 1943,
at 4, col. 3.
83 Rand Daily Mail, Dec. 29, 1944, at 3, col. 7.
86 Id.
[Vol. 18:239
LEGAL AID IN SOUTH AFRICA
of the appropriate government departments, the legal profession, and
other groups approved by the appropriate Law Society.17 These com-
mittees were responsible to the Law Societies which, in turn, were
responsible to the Department of Social Welfare. Each Law Society
could veto committee decisions subject to a right of appeal to the
Minister. The Department of Social Welfare provided financing for
the Bureau operations. The Bureaus favored this combination of
governmental financing and local control.
81
Upon implementation of the plan, each Bureau divided its work
load into criminal and civil matters. The Bureaus further subdivided
cases into those requiring litigation and those that did not. A panel
of local Side-Bar members, associated with local firms, made them-
selves available to render free assistance. With respect to criminal
matters, the Bureaus usually aided only those indigent accused having
a prima facie defense or those facing non-capital charges. This policy
precluded representation of indigents seeking mitigation of punish-
ment, and also resulted in delay in the acquisition of counsel.8 9
Potential clients also faced difficulty in reaching the Bureaus. Some
Bureaus employed a criminal investigator who, accompanied by an
attorney, visited cells each morning and interviewed those awaiting
trial. After identifying and interviewing those prisoners meeting the
Bureau's eligibility requirements, 90 a Bureau sometimes sent a rep-
resentative to discuss tl{e cases with the police investigating officer
or the prosecutor. This practice occassionally resulted in the charges
being dropped. If the case required an appearance and no panel
member was able to attend, the Bureau offered the accused advice
on how to conduct a pro se defense.
Despite institution of the Minister's 1944 plan, problems which had
previously plagued the Bureaus continued. Financial difficulties per-
sisted, resulting in an inability to acquire qualified help. Non-com-
petitive salaries prevented the employment of at least one qualified
lawyer at each Bureau. The government subsequently denied any
funding to the Bureaus. 9' This denial followed the representation by
87 Id.
11 Abramowitz, supra note 76, at 356.
89 Id. at 356-57.
90 In all cases the Bureaus employed a flexible means test to determine the indigency
of the accused. The basic criterion was whether the accused could afford to consult
a private lawyer. INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, FIFTH CONFERENCE REPORT OF
THE INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION 188 (1954).
9, Abramowitz, supra note 76, at 357.
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the Johannesburg Bureau of two allegedly non-indigent Africans. 92
Since the Africans were charged with violations of the Riotous As-
semblies Act, the withholding of aid may have in fact been a warning
to the Bureaus to refrain from representing political activists. Statistics
support this view, since the government objected to only one case
out of 3000 handled by the Bureaus in the preceding twelve months,
the case handled by the Johannesburg Bureau. 93 The Bureaus were
on the verge of closing when the government reinstated their grant. 94
That grant, together with public donations, prevented the system's
collapse. Thereafter, the Bureaus formed a fund in an attempt to
ensure a sufficient and regular income. In succeeding years, the
Bureaus also received grants from private organizations, individuals,
and the Law Societies themselves.
The next confrontation over legal aid arose on July 1, 1953, when
the government transferred the legal aid scheme from the Department
of Social Welfare to the Department of Justice. 95 The Department
of Justice had a longstanding interest in effecting this change as
evidenced by its appearance at the 194396 and 194497 Conferences. In
1948, the Secretary of Justice stated that "[a]lthough this organization
(the Legal Aid Bureau) actually functions under the aegis of the
Department of Social Welfare, this Department is vitally interested
in its activities which are an important and integral part of the
administration of justice." ' 98 Although it is arguable that the respon-
sibility for legal aid rightly belongs to a society's Department of
Justice, numerous conflicts arose between the Bureaus and the De-
partment in the 1950s. Clashes revolved especially around the question
of legal aid in criminal matters.
The conflict matured in the 1958 Report of the Department of
Justice,9 in which the Secretary of Justice announced that the-
92 Rand Daily Mail, Feb. 7, 1945, at 4, col. 6. The Bureau responded to the
Government by noting that the two were joint defendants and that although one
of them was just above the means test, the other met its requirements. Id.
91 Abramowitz, supra note 76, at 357.
94 Id.; Rand Daily Mail, Aug. 6, 1945, at 5, col. 6.
9' UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1953 (1954).
96 See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
97 See supra notes 85-86.
98 UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1948, para. 20 (1949).
9' UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1958 (1959).
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Department of Justice would commence negotiations with the As-
sociation of Law Societies and the Bar Council for a new legal aid
scheme and criticized the activities of the Bureaus. The report ques-
tioned the necessity of legal aid in criminal matters:
The investigation has revealed that (legal) assistance is apparently
not necessary in criminal cases. This view is based on the fact that
our whole legal system is designed to prevent the conviction of an
innocent person, whether he is defended or not, and that it is the
duty of judicial officers and prosecutors, who are considered quite
capable of doing so, to ensure that no miscarriages of justice occur.' °°
This argument was not new in South Africa. It had enjoyed some
currency as early as the 1935 Conference' ° 1 in which participants
argued that in petty cases magistrates were able to, and made an
effort to, get all the facts from the accused, regardless of represen-
tation by counsel, and that qualified counsel was both unnecessary
and impractical in the vast majority of cases. Section 210 of the
Criminal Procedure Act of 1955 arguably supported this position,
providing that the court "may at any stage subpoena . . . any person
as a witness . . . and the court shall subpoena . . . and examine . . .
any person if his evidence appears to it essential to the just decision
of the case." 0 2 While the expressed intention was laudable, the court
at least at that time had an ethical responsibility to remain impartial;
it should not have had to assume the role of counsel for the accused. 1
0 3
o Id. at 4-5.
,o, See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
, Criminal Procedure Act, No. 56 of 1955 § 210 (repealed in 1977).
,03 Until 1977, the trial method preferred in South Africa was the British accu-
satorial system which requires that the judicial officer in a court of law adopt a
neutral attitude during proceedings while listening to the arguments presented by
the prosecution and the defense; such a system holds that the accused is innocent
until proven guilty. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, POLITICAL IMPRISONMENT IN SOUTH
AFRICA 28-29 (1978). However, the introduction of Criminal Procedure Act 51 of
1977 brought an inquisitorial system to South Africa. Under this system, the presiding
judicial officer becomes involved in pre-trial investigation. The Act provides that at
the beginning of summary trials, presiding judicial officers may ask those accused
who plead not guilty if they wish to make a statement of the grounds of their
defense. If the accused do not consent to do this and if the extent to which they
admit or deny the elements of each charge is unclear, the judicial officers may
question the accused in order to ascertain which elements of the charges are in
dispute. Under the Act, the judicial officers may "enquire from the accused whether
any allegation which is not placed in issue by the plea of not guilty, may be recorded
as an admission by the accused of that allegation." Criminal Procedure Act, No.
51 of 1977 § 115(2)(b)(1). Since many African accused speak neither English nor
19881
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The Report similarly criticized the need for legal assistance in
criminal conviction appeals. It argued that "[w]ith regard to appeals
in criminal cases it is also considered that legal assistance should not
be rendered for the reason that there is nothing to prevent an accused
person from appealing without such assistance."''0 4 This argument,
however, ignores the fact that the prosecution of an appeal with its
various procedural intricacies requires professional skills. Moreover,
without the assistance of counsel the indigent will not know when
or even whether to take an appeal.
With respect to the appointment of pro deo counsel in capital
cases, the Report apparently acknowledged the chance of error and
the need for qualified counsel to reduce this chance. ,05 This argument,
however, is unduly narrow. The duty of the state, as representative
of the community, is to minimize the chance for a miscarriage of
justice. This duty should not be confined to capital crimes; rather,
it should be extended to all situations in which the accused is con-
fronted with the possibility of the loss of liberty. °6
The dispute between the Bureaus and the Department of Justice
resulted in a chronic shortage of funding leading to the eventual
closing of almost all of the Bureaus in the late 1950s. The Jo-
hannesburg Bureau, which received a government grant until 1961,
was the only exception; it continues to operate through fund-raising
campaigns and grants from the Johannesburg City Council and the
Transvaal Law Society.10 7 Thus, the initial attempt at creating some
sort of viable legal aid service failed just over ten years after the
opening of the first Legal Aid Bureau in Johannesburg. The state
of legal aid in South Africa (with the exception of the Johannesburg
Bureau) reverted to its pre-1947 position.
Afrikaans, the languages of the court, this judicial procedure causes many unre-
presented defendants to incriminate themselves and jeopardize their defense during
pre-trial interrogation. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra, at 29. Under the present
system then, it becpm impossible for the judicial officer to assume the role of
counsel for the accused, ,
'0' UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1985, at 5 (1959). -"
101 The Report conceded that "[in so far as capital crimes are concerned, it is
generally felt that as the accused's life, his most precious possession, is at stake in
such a case, the present procedure whereby pro deo counsel are assigned to persons
charged with such crimes should be continued." Id.
106 This is the situation in the United States. See supra text accompanying note
63 (discussion of Argersinger).
10 Cook, supra note 79, at 31.
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The experiment, however, had created a valuable precedent. In the
early 1960s, the Department of Justice considered implementing a
national legal aid plan. After discussions with the Association of Law
Societies, it instituted such a plan in 1962, but the plan never became
fully functional. 0
While the national plan enjoyed varying degrees of success through-
out the country, by the mid-1960s it became inoperative. The plan's
failure resulted from a lack of publicity, especially impacting rural
areas where the system enjoyed little success, a lack of remuneration
for members of the legal profession leading to a loss of interest in
the system, and an overabundance of red tape and unwieldiness.
Concurrently, the early 1960s saw the formation of the Defence
and Aid Fund, an organization whose goals included supplying funds
to those charged with political crimes. The government disapproved
of this practice, and on March 18, 1966, declared Defence and Aid
an illegal organization. °9 In the wake of the ensuing public outcry,
the government declared that it did not object to the defense of
accused persons and welcomed the availability of such defense." 0 A
Department of Justice circular was distributed outlining the procedure
'0 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1962 (1963) [hereinafter JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ANNUAL
REPORT 1963]. The new system operated in the following manner. The administration
and control of the system lay entirely with the Department of Justice. The Department
appointed legal aid officers from its staff at all magistrates' and Bantu Affairs
Commissioners' Courts. Those seeking legal aid would then contact the legal aid
officer in their area. The officer would consider the request and employ a means
test to determine if the applicant qualified for legal aid. The legal aid officer
functioned under the general control of the Ibcal legal aid committee which oversaw
the administration of legal aid in its area. Such a committee existed at each center
where the Department of Justice had appointed a local legal aid officer. Each
committee consisted of the magistrate who wag ex officio chdirman, a representative
of the Department of Social Welfare and Pensions, an advocate, and an attorney.
Each committee established a means tesfor its particular area and varied it as it
deemed necessary. Thus, the local committees had flexibility on this critical issue.
As further evidence of flexibility, each committee reviewed the applications and,
when appropriate, varied decisions of the legal aid officer regarding applications for
legal aid. In addition to an ability to deal with local problems when they arose,
committees had the opportunity to submit suggestions regarding the improvement
of the system to the Administrative Head of the Department of Justice. Id.
109 Id. at 32. The government declared Defence and Aid illegal in terms of the
Suppression of Commission Act 44 of 1950, and it appointed a liquidator to liquidate
the organization's assets and handle the funds then in the organization's possession.
Id.
110 Cook, supra note 79, at 32.
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for obtaining counsel under the revised system."' This system, which
operated from 1966 to 1969, resulted in the appointment of a qualified
legal adviser in only twenty-four cases.12
By the mid-1960s, many members of the legal profession perceived
a need for a comprehensive legal aid system. The 1962 scheme was
in a disfunctional state, and Defence and Aid dealt primarily with
the accused in political trials. This left the vast majority of the poor
without access to legal assistance. A debate ensued within the legal
profession and between the profession and the Department of Justice
on the formation of a new national legal aid system.
During this period the Department of Justice remained adamant
in its refusal to recognize the need for legal assistance in criminal
cases." 3 In support of its position, the Department cited the absence
of a state obligation" 4 as well as the training and experience of
"I The circular had five main provisions. Id. at 33. First, in cases where the
Defence and Aid Fund had incurred liabilities toward advocates and attorneys, the
liquidator should recognize their right to compensation if the organization's assets
were sufficient to cover these expenses. Second, advocates and attorneys engaged
by the Fund before March 18, 1966, but not yet having appeared on behalf of their
clients, should continue to represent the clients and submit fee statements to the
liquidator. Third, in cases where any advocate or attorney withdrew from the case,
the court should inquire as to whether the accused wished to have another legal
representative. If the accused indicated that he so desired, then the circular provided
for the appointment of counsel. Fourth, in each case the Chief Magistrate was to
consult with the Senior Public Prosecutor and examine the circumstances of the
case. If the accused wished to have the services of a legal practitioner, the Chief
Magistrate was to call upon the Local Side Bar Association or the Local Bar Council
to appoint an attorney or advocate. Fifth, the government assumed responsibility
for payment of such attorneys and advocates. Id.
,,2 Id. The State paid legal fees of just over R9000. The Liquidator of the Defence
and Aid Fund eventually controlled a sum of approximately R12000; the Minister
of Justice then instructed him to pay the money to the Association of Law Societies
for use for an appropriate purpose. Later, the Association of Law Societies paid
this sum to the Legal Aid Board, created by the Legal Aid Act of 1969. Id. For a
discussion of the Board and the Act, see infra notes 126-47 and accompanying text.
"I The Department of Justice Report for 1965 reiterated, the arguments made in
the 1958 Report. REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1965 (1966) [hereinafter JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
ANNUAL REPORT 1965].
14 JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ANNUAL REPORT 1965, supra note 113, at 5. The Report
stated that:
At the outset it must be clearly understood that no obligation rests on the
State to ensure that all indigent accused persons are defended by an advocate
or attorney. Not only is such a system not warranted but it would also
undermine the administration of justice and would moreover be completely
inconsistent with the general juridical and social pattern in this country.
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judicial officers.' 15 The Department also attempted to explain its
justification for the appointment of pro deo counsel in capital cases
on the basis of the finality of the death penalty and the impossibility
of post-execution rectification. 116
It is not clear how legal representation in criminal matters can
possibly undermine the administration of justice as the Report sug-
gests. This view apparently rests on the presupposition that defendants
in criminal cases are guilty until proven innocent." 7 In fact, the
Department's Report asserts that "we must constantly guard against
the possibility of our attempts to assist the criminal being carried
out at the expense of law-abiding citizens or having the effect of
materially impairing the efficiency of our legal machinery. '" 8
The Report qualified its negative attitude toward legal aid in crim-
inal cases by asserting that it was not "unsympathetic" as long as
suggestions for improvement of the 1962 scheme did "not entail the
direct involvement of the State in, or its acceptance of responsibility
for, the defence of accused persons, and provided further that there
[was] no departure from the general principles indicated [in the Re-
port].''' 9
In early 1966, the General Bar Council' 2 addressed the matter and
proposed the establishment of a Judicial Commission to consider the
Id. The Report asserted that:
the training and experience of presiding judicial officers and prosecutors
and the prescribed rules of court procedure are such that an innocent person
will normally not be convicted, whether he be defended or not; and should
this happen in isolated cases, there are, in the Department's opinion,
adequate safeguards designed to bring to light and to rectify the miscarriage
of justice by way of review by a superior court or otherwise.
116 Id. The Report stated that:
this is the only reason why the State sees to it, as far as possible, that
accused persons in capital cases are defended, and in fact also takes other
measures to ensure that no innocent person is executed. These considerations
obviously do not apply in cases not punishable by death.
"7 See supra text accompanying note 103.
I8 JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ANNUAL REPORT 1965, supra note 113, at 5 (emphasis
added).
119 Id.
20 The advocates profession in South Africa is composed of societies of practicing
advocates called bars. There are seven bars in the Republic. These seven are federated
in the General Bar Council. The objectives of the General Bar Council are: 1) to
consider, promote, and deal with all matters concerning the teaching and practice
of law and the administration of justice; 2) to deal with all matters affecting the
profession and to take action thereon; and 3) to represent the interests of advocates.
The Council also examines and takes whatever action it deems appropriate in regard
19881 259
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most efficacious method of supplying legal aid.1'2 The problem of
legal aid became the subject of a debate at the meeting of the
Association of Law Societies held in Pretoria on August 30 and 31,
1966.122 The Association appointed a National Committee on Legal
Aid to examine the problems and take what steps it deemed necessary
on behalf of the Association. The Committee met for the first time
in Pretoria on September 16, 1966.123 Representatives from the Bar
and the Secretary for Justice attended. Those present at the meeting
decided that the Committee members in attendance would each write
a memorandum offering suggestions concerning the creation of a
national legal aid system. The Committee reconvened in Cape Town
on November 17 and 18, 1966, to examine the memoranda. 124 During
the months that followed, the Committee held meetings, prepared
and debated various proposed legislative enactments, and met with
the Secretary of Justice. Eventually, the Committee drafted the leg-
islation that was to become Legal Aid Act No. 22 of 1969. The Act,
promulgated on March 26 of that year, established the legal aid
system which currently exists in South Africa.2 5
III. LEGAL AID SINCE 1969
A. The National System Described
i. The Act
The Legal Aid Act established a Legal Aid Board, a corporate
body whose goal is "to render or make available legal aid to indigent
persons.' 1 26 To this end, the Act empowers the Board, inter alia, to
to legislation and the administration of justice. It gathers evidence for submission
to government or provincial commissions or committees and makes or joins in
making representations to ministers or other persons or bodies on matters concerning
the profession. See generally, H. HAIno & E. KAHN, supra note 3, at 281-85.
221 Cook, supra note 79, at 35.
22 The Association adopted the view that the creation of a Judicial Commission
would be an unnecessary waste of time. Id.
,23 Id. at 34.
24 Id. at 35.
12 Legal Aid Act No. 22 of 1969. The national legal aid system took effect in
South Africa on March 29, 1971, and in South West Africa/Namibia including the
Caprivi Zipfel on June 16, 1971. CONSOLDATED LEGAL AID GUIDE para. 4.3.
226 Legal Aid Act No. 22 of 1969 § 3; cf. Strauss v. Strauss, [1973] 3 S.A. 788
(A) 799; Opperman v. Opperman, [19751 3 S.A. 337 (0) 338.
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obtain the services of legal practitioners 127 and to "fix conditions
subject to which legal aid is to be rendered."' 12 The Act determines
the constitution of the Board; providing for representation by the
bench, the organized legal profession, and several government de-
partments. 129 Specifically, the Board consists of a judge of the Su-
preme Court appointed by the Minister of Justice;3 0 one practicing
advocate and four practicing attorneys nominated by the General
Council of the Bar of South Africa and the Association of Law
Societies respectively and appointed by the Minister; 3' and an ad-
ditional member appointed by the Minister. 3 2 The other members of
the Board are the Secretary of Justice,' the Secretary for Black
Administration and Development,' 3 4 the Secretary for Social Welfare
and Prisons, " and the State Attorney. 3 6 Under the Act, the Minister
may, in his discretion, terminate the period of office of any appointed
member or his alternate if "there are good reasons for doing so."'137
27 Legal Aid Act No. 22 of 1969 § 3a. In addition, § 3 of the Act gives the
Board power:
(b) to purchase or otherwise acquire or to hold or alienate any movable
property or, with approval of the Minister acting in consultation with the
Minister of Finance, any immovable property;
(c) to hire or let any movable or immovable property;
(e) to do all such things and perform all such functions as may be necessary
for or incidental to the attainment of the objects of the board.
121 Id. at § 3d. According to § 3d, these conditions include those:
in accordance with which any rights in respect of costs recovered or re-
coverable in any legal proceedings in respect of which the aid is rendered,
shall be ceded to the board, and conditions relating to the payment of
contributions to the board by persons to whom legal aid is rendered.
129 Id. at § 4(1).
30 Id. at § 4(l)(a).
I d. at § 4(l)(b).
32 Id. at § 4(1)(g). According to § 4(2)(a):
The Minister may appoint a person to serve as an alternate in the stead
of any member referred to in paragraph (b) or (g) of subsection (1), during
such member's absence from any meeting of the board, if such person is
qualified to be appointed as such member and has been nominated in the
same manner as such member.
I d. at § 4(l)(c).
134 Id. at § 4(l)(d).
- Id. at § 4(l)(e).
136 Id. at § 4(3)(f). According to § 4(2)(b): "If any member of the board referred
to in paragraph (c), (d), (e), or (f) of subsection (1) is unable for any reason to
attend any meeting of the board, he may designate any officer in his department
or office to represent him at such meeting."
1 Id. at § 4(3)(c). According to § 4(3)(b): "Any member of the board or his
alternate whose term of office has expired, shall be eligible for reappointment."
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The Board, itself, however, determines the frequency of its meetings 131
although the Act requires a quorum of six members. 3 9
The Act also deals with the problem of funding, providing that in
addition to the money the South African Parliament appropriates to
it, 14 the Board may receive money from any other source.' 4' The
Board, upon request, must provide the Minister of Justice with in-
formation concerning its activities and financial position. 142 The Legal
Aid Board must submit an annual report to the Minister including
an audited balance sheet and statement of income and expenditure 43
which the Minister must table in both houses of parliament.' 44
The Board has wide discretion in operational matters since the
Legal Aid Act provides only a broad framework. 14 Thus, it appears
that the Board could have chosen to employ its own legal practitioners
to assist indigent persons, rather than to set up a network of referral
agencies. The Board has incorporated its directives in the Consolidated
Legal Aid Guide.'"6 Revised periodically, the Guide contains the
Board's directives, a set of rules made in terms of the Act with the
force of delegated legislation. 47 Thus, an understanding of the South
African legal aid system may be achieved by an examination of the
Guide.
138 Id. at § 5(1). According to § 5(2): "The Chairman of the board may at any
time, and shall at the request in writing of not less than six members of the board,
convene a special meeting of the board, to be held at such time and place as he
may determine."
,19 Id. at § 6(1). According to § 6(2): "Any decision at any meeting of the board
shall be by majority of votes of the members present, and in the event of an equality
of votes in regard to any matter, the person presiding at the meeting shall have a
casting vote in addition to a deliberative vote."
140 Id. at § 9(l)(a).
141 Id. at § 9(3). Thus, for example, the Board received the remaining funds
confiscated from the banned Defence and Aid Fund. See supra notes 109-12 and
accompanying text.
142 Legal Aid Aid Act No. 22 of 1969 § 9(10).
143 Id.
Id. at § 9(11). Section 9(11) provides that:
The Minister shall lay the said report upon the Table of the Senate and
of the House of Assembly within fourteen days after receipt thereof, if
Parliament is then in ordinary session, or, if Parliament is not in ordinary
session, within fourteen days after the commencement of the next ensuing
ordinary session.
141 CONSOLIDATED LEGAL AID GUIDE, para. 4.4.
"4 Attorneys may obtain copies from the secretaries of the Provincial Law Societies.
CONSOLIDATED LEGAL AID GUIDE, para. 26.1.
141 Legal Aid Act No. 22 of 1969 §§ 2-3.
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ii. The Guide
The Legal Aid Guide provides for the Legal Aid Board's resolutions
to be carried out under the supervision of the Director of Legal Aid
who is an officer of the Board.14 The legal aid system comprises a
combination of legal aid officers in the main centres, i.e. Pretoria,
Johannesburg, Cape Town, Athlone (Cape), Port Elizabeth, and
Durban, and a network of designated legal aid officers in the Mag-
istrates' and Commissioners' Courts in the different provinces and
in the homelands.' 49 These officers are typically employees of the
Department of Justice or the Department of Bantu Administration,
although occasionally they are Legal Aid Board employees. 150 The
legal aid offices operate as referral agencies. The officer considers
whether an applicant qualifies for aid in compliance with the Legal
Aid Guide. Once eligibility is established, the officer refers the indigent
to a qualified attorney.'" The Guide recognizes that legal practitioners
should be remunerated for their work and establishes a schedule of
fees for attorneys and advocates. 152 These fee arrangements rest upon
the principle that legal aid work is not charitable work. Furthermore,
where practicable, the legal aid officer must honor the applicant's
choice of attorney.'
While the Act does not define "indigent", the Guide provides that
an indigent person is "a natural person who qualifies for legal aid
in terms of this guide."'15 4 The Guide further notes that "legal aid
includes advice.' 1 55
The Guide prescribes an overall means test which is modified
periodically to determine indigence.' 56 The means test establishes an
income ceiling figure, i.e. the maximum monthly income a person
may earn and remain eligible for legal aid.' 57 The same ceiling figure
141 CONSOLIDATED LEGAL AID GuIDE para. 4.2.
t,1 Id. at para. 4.7.
30 Id. at para. 14.1.
Id. at para. 14.4.
52 Id. at para. 43.1. According to para. 43.1: "An advocate shall be remunerated
in accordance with the rules and tariffs of fees on which the Board and the General
Council of the Bar of South Africa have agreed and no additional fees may be
received." Id.
153 Id.
,14 Id. at para. 1.1(f).
"I Id. at para. 1.1(g).
,56 Id. at para. 5.1. One test applies to single persons and estranged spouses while
another applies to married persons.
,"I For example, in 1980 the figure for married couples was R340 per month while
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applies to all population groups in South Africa, since legal costs
are the same for all racial groups.' 58 The monthly figures for married
couples are double those for single persons and estranged spouses. 5 9
The test is based upon calculated income which takes both income
and assets into account. 16° Calculated income means income from all
sources after deductions for compulsory pension contributions, tax
duty and maintenance payments or contributions in respect of natural
or adopted children not under the applicant's care, plus one percent
of the unencumbered value in excess of R1000 of the assets of the
applicant, or in the case of a married applicant, the couple's joint
assets.16 ' Calculated income does not include the value of furniture,
clothing, groceries, and tools of trade. 62
The Guide provides that those who have sufficient "disposable
capital" to pay for the required legal aid may not receive assistance. 163
The applicant must satisfy the legal aid officer that he is indigent
and, at the officer's request, must offer documentary proof of income,
value of assets, number of dependent children and other relevant
matters.164 Depending on the applicant's calculated income, the officer
may require payment in advance to the indigent's appointed attor-
ney. 65 Nevertheless, the Director of Legal Aid may fully or partially
exempt from contributing an individual who, because of circumstances
beyond his control, cannot make the prescribed contribution. 66 The
that for single persons was R170. 1980 LEGAL AID BOARD REPORT (1981). Such
figures are just over twice the subsistence level for Africans and Coloureds. D.
MCQUOID-MASON, supra note 8, at 76.
,"I From 1971 to 1978, the means test was different for each racial group. In
1978, the Board recognized that legal costs are the same for all groups. 1978 LEGAL
AID BOARD REPORT 2 (1979).
"9 CONSOLIDATED LEGAL AID GUIDE para. 5.2.
160 Id. In the case of a married person, the income and assets of both spouses
are relevant. The Guide defines a married person as one joined in a union recognized
as a marriage in accordance with any law or custom. CONSOLIDATED LEGAL AID
GUIDE para. 1.1(i). This seems to include those married according to Muslim, Hindu,
or traditional African rites. The Guide gives spouse a corresponding meaning.
161 Id. at para. 5.3.
162 Id.
163 CONSOLIDATED LEGAL AID GUIDE para. 5.5. The Guide states that disposable
capital is cash in hand and deposits as credit in a bank or savings account, not
required for the usual daily necessities of life. Id. at para. 1.l(e).
,64 Id. at para. 6. According to para. 6.2: "If assistance is rendered to a person
with no income, the reason why such person has no income, shall be briefly stated
by the legal aid officer at the foot of the triplicate instruction form."
165 Id. at paras. 7.1-.2.
i6 Id. at para. 8.1.
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Director may also grant legal aid to any individual who does not
qualify under the means test but who is indigent under a subjective
test and deserves sympathetic consideration because of exceptional
circumstances. 167
Subject to certain exceptions and compliance with the means test,
the Guide permits legal aid in all cases that require the assistance of
a legal practitioner. 68 However:
If a legal aid officer is satisfied that an applicant is unemployed
without sound reasons, or that he leads a dissolute or dishonest
life, or that he is as a result of his misconduct or neglect unable
to bear the legal costs himself, no legal aid shall be rendered to
him.169
As regards legal aid in criminal cases, the Guide provides that the
legal aid officer decides "whether it shall be just and reasonable that
an accused be assisted by the Board" after considering "a) court
procedure, especially in so far as it is aimed at ensuring that justice
is done to accused persons whether they are legally represented or
not; and b) all the circumstances of the relevant case.' 170 The Guide
then sets forth rules governing the officer's application of these
principles. These rules stipulate that legal aid is available in all criminal
matters except:
a) if pro deo defense is available;
b) in respect of offences for which an admission of guilt has been
determined or which can be compounded;
c) in respect of cases where the commission of the offense is admitted
and the accused's defense or excuse is so simple that it can be
advanced by the accused himself without aid;
d) in respect of a traffic offence or any other offence connected
with the use of a motor vehicle;
e) in a preparatory examination; and
f) for the institution of a private prosecution. 7 '
,67 Id. at para. 8.1. The Guide contains a paragraph warning legal aid officers to
be wary of applicants who can afford to pay for legal services but who, nevertheless,
try to abuse the system by applying for aid. Id. at para. 36.
,68 Id. at para. 11.1. According to para. 11.2: "In deserving cases where an accused
pleads guilty, legal aid may also be rendered with a view to submitting grounds of
extenuation, unless these are of such a nature that they can be raised by the accused
himself."
169 Id. at para. 10.1.
10 Id. at para. 12.
"I Id. at para. 12.1.
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If an applicant does not qualify for legal aid in terms of the above
provisions or in terms of the means test, the legal aid officer must
inform him accordingly. 72 The officer must further inform the ap-
plicant of the right to an appeal with the Director of Legal Aid.'
73
The applicant must submit the grounds of appeal in writing to the
legal aid officer who, in turn, must forward them to the Director
together with his comments. 74 An applicant also has the right of
appeal to the Chairman of the Legal Aid Board if the Director refuses
to render him assistance. 75 In such cases, the applicant must submit
the grounds of appeal in writing to the Director, who must forward
them to the Chairman together with his comments.
176
In cases in which the accused qualifies for legal aid, the legal aid
officer refers him to any local attorney who is willing to accept the
instruction, provided that: "a) if no local attorney is available the
nearest available attorney may be instructed; 7 7 b) where practicable,
in criminal trials an attorney at the center where the case is to be
heard must be instructed; 78 and c) where practicable effect must be
given to the applicant's choice of attorney.' 1 79 If an attorney accepts
a legal aid case, he must satisfy himself that his instructions are
clear.1'0 Where applicable, he must collect the client's contribution
before incurring any costs.' 8 ' If for any reason an attorney decides
not to accept the matter after he has been instructed, he must inform
the legal aid officer and send the applicant back to him.
8 2
An attorney who is instructed in a legal aid matter and decides to
accept the case must render the assistance himself, although where
172 Id. at para. 14.2. The legal aid officer, however, does not have to furnish
reasons for his refusal.
173 Id. at para. 19.1.
174 Id.
175 Id. at para. 19.2.
176 Id.
171 Id. at para. 20.1(a).
178 Id. at para. 20.1(b).
179 Id. at para. 20.1(c). The Guide requires the legal aid officer to ensure as far
as possible that the work is divided evenly among attorneys who undertake legal
aid work and in proportion to the size of their firms. Id. at para. 20.1(d).
180 Id. at para. 27.2(a). In addition, according to para. 27.2(b): "If an attorney
accepts a case on a legal aid basis, he shall satisfy himself that it has been indicated
whether a contribution must be made by the applicant." Id. Paragraph 27.3 provides
that "[i]f there are any mistakes or anything is not clear, the matter shall be taken
up with the legal aid officer concerned or referred to the Director."
181 Id. at para. 27.4. Failure to collect the contribution in advance may result in
the attorney having to bear that portion of the expenses himself. Id. at para. 7.1.
182 Id. at para. 27.1.
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necessary he may generally brief a correspondent and/or an advo-
cate. 183 The Guide, however, places several restraints on the attorney's
freedom of action in this regard. Without the written permission of
the Director of Legal Aid, the attorney may not: "a) brief an advocate
in a case in which he is by law entitled to appear himself;'8 4 b) brief
a senior advocate; 8 and c) prosecute an appeal."'1 8 6 The attorney
may use his discretion in selecting a correspondent, but must brief
the advocate in accordance with the rules of the local bar.18 7
An attorney who has been instructed in a legal aid case must neither
render assistance outside his instructions nor make applications or
institute suits in addition to the main suit, without the written consent
of the Director of Legal Aid. 188 If necessary, however, a legal aid
attorney may proceed by way of substituted service without the prior
consent of the Legal Aid Board. 8 9 A legal aid attorney need not
submit regular progress reports but should advise the Director of
Legal Aid if he has completed rendering his service, if the case has
petered out, or if there is likely to be a long delay in the finalization
of the case.' 9° Finally, the Guide expects that attorneys and advocates
"I Id. at para. 27.6. South Africa's bifurcated legal profession is comprised of
attorneys and advocates. Briefing a correspondent or advocate is the practice of
informing the advocate, who will appear in court, of the facts of the case. According
to para. 27.9 of the Legal Aid Guide:
Before engaging in litigation, an attorney or advocate shall satisfy himself
that a client in a civil case has reasonable prospects of success and in the
case of a criminal case that he has an acceptable defence against the charge,
or if the commission of the offence is admitted, that there are extenuating
circumstances which cannot be advanced by the accused himself.
Id. at para. 27.6(a).
185 Id. at para. 27.6(b).
186 Id. at para. 27.6(c).
187 Id. at para. 27.7. The correspondent or advocate must be prepared to perform
his services according to the legal aid tariff. He is also bound by the provisions in
the LEGAL AID GUIDE. Id.
18 Id. at para. 27.10.
189 Id. at para. 31.1.
190 Id. at para. 38.1. Paragraph 38.1 provides that "[a] file shall however, be
opened in respect of each legal aid case at the head office of the Board and these
files shall from time to time be closed and destroyed in order to make room for
storage." In addition, under para. 38.2:
If an attorney who has been instructed on the Board's behalf does not
submit a final account in respect of the matter or report on the delay,
within one year from the date of the instruction, he shall be requested in
writing to do so within twenty-one days. If an attorney remains in default
to comply with such a request, the Board's file shall be closed and it shall
be deemed, without waiver of any rights of the Board, that no moneys are
owed to the attorney.
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briefed in legal aid matters will guard against the possible abuse of
the Legal Aid Board's services; consequently, it requires them to
report any changes in the applicant's circumstances which may affect
the applicant's continuing ability to receive legal aid.19' It requires
attorneys, during interviews, to establish from their clients whether
the clients still. qualify according to the means test. If they do not,
the case cannot proceed without written consent of the Director of
Legal Aid.1 92 Thus, a person receiving legal aid who subsequently
acquires sufficient funds typically may not continue to receive assis-
tance from the Legal Aid Board.
93
While the Legal Aid Act and the Legal Aid Guide appear to
establish a national scheme of legal assistance capable of meeting the
demand for legal aid in South Africa, analysis reveals that major
problems beset the system. In short, the system is underfinanced,
underpublicized, and underutilized, and, therefore, ineffective in sup-
plying legal aid to indigents.
B. The National System Evaluated
While the failure of the National Legal Aid scheme in South Africa
lies in its practical operation, the practice is derived from the directives
contained in the Act and the Guide which themselves require revision.
i. The Act
The Act's broad outline is favorable in that it offers flexibility in
designing and adapting South Africa's legal aid system to meet present
and future needs, 94 and eliminates the need for perpetual legislative
amendments.' 95
On the negative side, the composition of the Board under the Act,
and the broad powers the Act gives the Minister of Justice in the
appointment and possible termination of members to the Board,196
convey the impression that the Board is not an independent entity
but rather has a pro-state bias. The public perception that the Board
is associated with the state may deter the black poor from seeking
assistance. The Board's unwillingness to fund litigation with potential
political implications supports the suspicion that the Board is part
191 Id. at para. 41.1.
192 Id. at para. 41.2.
193 Id.
- Cf. Opperman v. Opperman, [1975] 3 S.A. 337 (0) 338.
, See supra notes 126-45 and accompanying text.
- See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
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of the state machinery. 97 For example,' 9s in Scott and Others v.
Hanekom and Others, a group of residents of the black township of
Moekweni in Paarl tried to challenge the legality of a community
council election in their area on the grounds that "the election process
had been clothed in secrecy, had been done in a dark corner."' 199
"As a result of this secrecy, argued the residents, 'stooges' had been
'elected' to the council. ' '200 The residents sought to have the courts
invalidate the election results so that a new election might be held,
and approached a law firm in this regard. The residents contacted
the firm only as a last resort after meetings with public officials,
complaints to the press, public demonstrations, and a petition to
Parliament produced no results. The lawyers then went to the Board
on behalf of their clients, all of whom were sufficiently indigent to
satisfy the means test. The Board, however, refused them legal aid
on various grounds, including lack of probable cause in bringing the
suit (despite a contrary opinion by senior counsel whose views the
Supreme Court eventually adopted) and the assertion that it was not
Board policy to grant legal aid for matters which involved the interests
of more than one person. The Legal Aid Guide, however, contains
no resolutions prohibiting the rendition of legal aid in class or group
actions,20' and states that, subject to a few exceptions (of which
setting aside an election is not one), "legal aid shall be rendered in
all cases where the assistance of a legal practitioner is normally
required. "202
The lawyers for the group eventually brought the case without
Legal Aid funding and vindicated their clients' claims in the Supreme
191 See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text. Since the Board has a chairman
who is a judge, five representatives from the state, and five representatives from
the profession, this composition ostensibly divides power equally among the state
and the profession with the judge as a neutral party. The South African judiciary,
however, is not independent of the Executive and the Legislature. For critiques of
the judiciary's lack of independence, see COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE STRUCTURE
AND FUNCTIONING FOR THE COURTS PART A, Vol. I at 55-93 (1983); J. DUGARD,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER (1978); INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION OF JURISTS, EROSION OF THE RULE OF LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA (1968).
198 See Budlender, Lawyers and Poverty: Beyond "Access to Justice", CARNEGIE
CONFERENCE PAPER No. 91, SECOND CARNEGIE INQUIRY INTO POVERTY AND DE-
VELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 4, (1984).
' [1930] (3) S.A. 1182 (c). For a detailed discussion of Scott, see Ladley, A
Guide to Legal Aid? Some Issues Arising From the Refusal of Legal Aid in the
Moekweni Community Council Case, 99 S. AIR. L.J. 237 (1982).
200 Ladley, supra note 199, at 237.
201 Id.
202 CONSOLIDATED LEGAL AID GUIDE para. 11.1.
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Court which set aside the elections. The Board's refusal to provide
aid not only gave the public reason to question its willingness to aid
the poor but also evidenced a conservative stance analogous to that
of the South African government in 1945 when it threatened to cut
off the Legal Aid Bureaus' funding because they had represented
clients in cases with political implications. 20 3 The Board's decision
also sets an even more alarming precedent for criminal cases with
political overtones. The Board, in choosing to behave as it did in
the Scott case, may deprive the accused of an adequate defense and
thus may contribute to his eventual conviction.
ii. The Guide
The Guide's compensation provision reflects the position that legal
aid work is not charity. Thus, members of the profession providing
such services are encouraged to give the same amount of effort to
legal aid cases as to other cases. 20 4 Similarly, the provision that a
successful applicant for legal aid should be able to choose his own
attorney elevates the status of the legal aid recipient to that of the
fee-paying client. 20
5
On the negative side is the Guide's provision on abuses of the
system by successful applicants. 2° Even assuming that in any society
there may be those who can afford to pay for assistance but seek
to use the system dishonestly, such abuse should be viewed as ex-
ceptional. It may be argued that the inclusion of a specific provision
warning legal aid officers to guard against possible abuses injects a
high level of suspicion into the system. This in turn renders the
identification of abusers a primary goal of legal aid officers, taking
precedence over the fundamental aims of legal aid work, i.e. at-
tempting to ensure equality before the law for the poor as well as
the rich. Unfortunately, this provision appears to reflect a larger
problem with the Guide, namely an over-all negative attitude toward
legal aid. Thus, for example, the Guide nowhere contains a provision
on the theoretical principles of equality and justice which underlie
the rendering of legal aid.
Another unacceptable provision reflecting the Guide's negative at-
titude is that which stipulates that an individual may not receive legal
aid if he is unemployed without sound reasons, leads a dissolute life,
203 See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
204 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
201 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
206 See supra text accompanying note 169.
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or as a result of his own misconduct or neglect cannot afford a
lawyer. 20 7 This provision is so vague that it gives the legal officer the
power to refuse aid because of his own personal prejudices while
justifying the refusal on one of these amorphous criteria. While the
legal aid officer's ability to deny aid in any society is discretionary,
this provision renders the decision arbitrary and exposes the system
to abuse from the very individuals, the legal aid officers, who should
have an interest in its development. 20 8 In practice, legal aid officers
use this provision to exclude from eligibility for assistance rural
workers, work-seekers who have not yet found employment, and
persons who have been unemployed for long periods even though
they report regularly to the labor employment bureaus. 209 This pro-
vision is further used to exclude applicants with prior convictions
although the Guide requires that the officer consider the nature of
the previous offences and the personality of the offender.
21 0
Various provisions on the rendering of legal aid in criminal cases
also manifest a negative attitude toward legal aid. Paragraph 12(1)(a)
provides that legal aid is not rendered in criminal matters "[i]f pro
deo defence is available, except where an attorney is instructed to
assist a pro deo advocate, provided the attorney's services cannot be
dispensed with and the director of legal aid consents thereto. ' 21 1 This
provision implies that legal representation is unnecessary because the
judge and the prosecutor will safeguard the rights of the accused.
This view, however, should be rejected for the reasons discussed
above. 212 Moreover, the Guide's exclusion from the legal aid system
of cases in which pro deo defence is available (i.e. capital cases) is
207 See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
208 The provision also presents a potential conflict with the South African rules
of evidence regarding the relevance of an accused's character and prior conduct.
For a further discussion of this proposition, see ANN. SuRv. S. AFR. L. 473 (1969);
Steyn, Public Participation in the Prevention of Crime, 88 S. AFR. L. J. 210, 218
(1971).
209 McQuoid-Mason, Legal Aid Clinics or Clearinghouses, DE REBUS PROCURA-
TORIIS 132, 134 (1977).
210 To deny an individual legal assistance because of previous convictions is an-
tithetical to the concept of a right to counsel. Moreover, it is arguable that these
individuals may have a greater need for assistance than those without prior con-
victions. For example, a person with a personality disorder and previous convictions
for similar offenses is likely to require the aid of a qualified practitioner to place
his condition before the court. See id.
21 CONSOLIDATED LEGAL AID GUIDE para. 12.2(a). See supra notes 170-71 and
accompanying text.
22 See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
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unacceptable because it perpetuates inequality between the rich and
the poor in capital cases; the indigent accused receiving pro deo
assistance has only the assistance of an advocate who is not aided
by an attorney, while an accused who can afford to pay for legal
services has the superior assistance of both an attorney and an ad-
vocate. 213 Arguably, it is in capital cases, where one stands the risk
of losing one's life, that the most adequate assistance is necessary.
Errors cannot be rectified post-mortem. Furthermore, by excluding
pro deo assistance from its ambit, the Guide also creates the anom-
alous situation that indigent accused charged with lesser offenses have
the benefit of assistance by attorneys and advocates.
The provision denying legal aid in traffic offenses or any other
offenses connected with the use of a motor vehicle in the absence
of written permission from the Director in exceptional circumstances 214
potentially precludes aid in serious cases such as reckless driving or
culpable homicide. The clause permitting an exception by the Director
does little to ameliorate the situation; there are no guidelines as to
what constitutes exceptional circumstances. Furthermore, the burden
of proving exceptional circumstances to the Director lies with the
applicant who may be illiterate or who may have a limited command
of English or Afrikaans. This problem is similarly applicable with
respect to the Guide's general provision for an indigent's right to
appeal in all cases in which legal aid is refused. 215 The Guide's failure
to require an officer to furnish reasons for a denial of aid further
compounds the difficulties of the indigent accused.
The Guide's negative bent also appears in the undue restraint it
places on attorneys' actions. It circumscribes their discretion in de-
ciding whether to prosecute an appeal and instead requires written
permission from the Director of Legal Aid. 216 In so providing, the
Guide gives the Director the ability to prevent appeals in cases which
have developed potentially important political implications. In Komani
v. Bantu Affairs Administration Board2 7 the Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court struck down regulations requiring the wives of
African men entitled to residence in an urban area to obtain lodgers'
permits in order to live permanently with their husbands. Although
213 See supra notes 71-74, 105-06 and accompanying text.
214 See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
2 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
216 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
217 [1980] (4) S.A. 448 (A).
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the Board financed the unsuccessful action in the Cape Provincial
Division of the Supreme Court, it refused to finance the eventually
successful appeal to the Appellate Division. 2 8 No reasons for the
refusal appeared. By the time of the decision in the Provincial Di-
vision, the press, in recognition of its political implications, had given
the case much attention. Arguably, the Board with its apparently
close ties to the state219 realized the political implications and no
longer wished to be involved. This circumscription of the province
of the attorney has even more profound implications in criminal cases
where the accused may be faced with the loss of liberty; by denying
an attorney the right to appeal in such cases, the Director, in effect,
becomes the final judge of the accused's case.
iii. The System in Practice
Beyond the difficulties caused by the wording of the Act and the
Guide, the system has proved ineffective in practice. The Board is
underfinanced, and what financing it does receive is spent ineffi-
ciently.220 The Board receives its funding in the form of an annual
grant from Parliament the amount of which has risen nearly every
year since 1969.221 Thus, while the 1967 budget was R50,000222 by
1984-85, the figure had increased to R4,105,000. 223 Nevertheless, the
1984-85 figure amounts to a per capita expenditure of only 0.15 cents
for South Africa's twenty-eight million people. 224 This figure compares
unfavorably with a 1982-83 per capita expenditure of $6.57 in Canada
and a 1984-85 per capita expenditure of £0.70 in the United King-
dom. 221
The Board spends these funds inefficiently. By choosing to create
a referral system of legal aid rather than hire salaried lawyers, the
Board must set aside large sums calculated on the basis of the number
211 The Legal Resources Center sponsored the appeal. For a discussion of the
work of the Center, see infra notes 297-99 and accompanying text.
219 See supra notes 196-203 and accompanying text.
220 See D. MCQUOID-MASON, supra note 8, at 70.
221 1969 LEGAL AD BOARD REPORT 3 (1970).
222 1967 LEGAL AD BOARD REPORT (1968).
223 1985 LEGAL AID BOAD REPORT 4 (1986).
224 Per capita expenditure calculated from 1984-85 annual grant from Parliament
statistic contained in 1985 LEGAL Am BOARD REPORT 4 (1986) and population figures
contained in L. THOMPSON & A. PRIOR, supra note 2, at 35.
225 CANADIAN CENTRE FOR JUSTICE STATISTICS, BRIEFING NOTES 2, (1984); LAW
SOCIETY OF GREAT BRITAIN, THIRTY-SIXTH LEGAL AID ANNUAL REPORT (1986).
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of pending cases to cover lawyers' fees. 226 Until 1976-77 the Board
set lawyers' tariffs at R250 per case. 227 In 1977-78 the figure increased
to R300. By 1984-85, the Legal Aid Board calculated an average cost
of R330 per case taken from a test sample of 1000 finalized cases.
221
Using this figure, it can be demonstrated that the referral system is
not cost effective. 229 During 1984-85, the Board paid private practi-
tioners the sum of R3,902,245; 23° it is not known how many cases
this amount covered. The number of cases referred to lawyers in that
year is not a satisfactory index because lawyers receive compensation
only after the judgment is rendered and because cases commenced
in one year often are completed the following year. In addition, cases
pending from prior years only may have been finalized in 1984-85.
Hence, the average cost per case for 1984-85 cannot be calculated.
Nevertheless, using the R330 figure per case, the R3,902,245 spent
that year would have paid for 11,825 cases. Assuming that twenty-
five percent of the R3,902,245 or R975,961 would be spent on op-
erating costs if the system used salaried lawyers, R2,926,284 would
be left for 117 lawyers' salaries. If each lawyer received R25,000 per
year and handled an estimated work load of 200 cases a year, the
117 lawyers would handle 23,400 cases per year, 11,575 more than
under the present system. Moreover, if private practitioners dealt with
these same 23,400 cases at the R330 rate of the present system, the
cost would have been R7,722,000, almost R3,819,755 more than the
total budget for 1984-85. Based on the foregoing calculations, it
appears that the current referral system is neither cost-efficient nor
manpower-efficient.
An additional difficulty is that what state-funded legal aid there
is does not reach the poor because the system is under-publicized.
The lack of publicity stems from what appears to be the Board's
negative attitude toward such publicity. Thus, the Board has main-
tained that the costs of advertising the system in newspapers is
"disproportionate to what can be achieved. ' 231 Consequently, by 1984
226 See LEGAL AID BOARD REPORTS (1970-86). The referral system exists even though
the wording of the Guide appears to allow for the establishment of an in-house
system. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
227 See 1977 LEGAL AiD BOARD REPORT 4 (1978).
228 1985 LEGAL ArD BOARD REPORT 9 (1986).
229 This hypothetical follows D. McQuoID-MASON supra note 8, at 71.
230 1985 LEGAL Am BOARD REPORT 7 (1986).
231 1976 LEGAL AD BOARD REPORT 6 (1977).
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the Board had spent only R450,251 on advertising. 2 2 This figure
compares unfavorably with similar figures from western countries.
For example, in 1971-72 alone, the Legal Aid committee in the United
Kingdom spent £295,000 on advertising.2 13 This anti-advertising bias
has led the South African Legal Aid Committee to rely on gratuitous
publicity from the press, radio, the legal profession, the university
law clinics, various state departments, and welfare organizations. The
policy thus consists of piecemeal attempts at publicization rather than
any comprehensive strategy of disseminating information about the
system. For example, in 1975, the Board sent an article explaining
the system to 100 newspapers and periodicals. 214 Four years later it
sent a letter describing the procedure for obtaining legal aid to a
newspaper with a large black readership. 235
The Board also manifested an anti-publicity bias by adopting the
position that the posting and maintaining of notices and posters in
public buildings was "impracticable. ' ' 23 6 In recent years the Board
modified its stance somewhat by permitting posters in courthouses
and post offices. 2 7 In any event, widespread illiteracy 238 among poor
blacks and an inability to read English or Afrikaans among those
literate in an African language further reduces the effectiveness of
the Board's attempts at publicity.
Those poor Africans whom the publicity does reach may still be
unable to use the legal aid system because of the location of legal
aid offices in urban centers. Although South Africa's repressive system
of "pass" laws which restrict the movement of Africans throughout
the country has been abolished, 23 9 new laws aimed at fostering "or-
232 1969-85 LEGAL AID BOARD REPORTS (1970-86). The 1977 Report gives the figure
of R469 for publicity in addition to advertising. 1977 LEGAL AID BOARD REPORT,
Annexure B (178). The 1985 Report does not give a figure for advertising or publicity.
233 J. CORRY, CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND CORRECTION 7, 21 (1976).
234 1975 LEGAL Am BOARD REPORT 3 (1976).
233 1979 LEGAL AD BOARD REPORT 4 (1980).
236 1974 LEGAL AID BOARD REPORT 2 (1975).
237 1977 LEGAL AID BOARD REPORT 2 (1978).
23 For detailed examinations of the problem of illiteracy, see Mawasha, Language,
Education and Poverty, CARNEGIE CONFERENCE PAPER No. 105, SECOND CARNEGIE
INQUIRY INTO POVERTY AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (1984); Pillay, The
Development and Underdevelopment of Education in South Africa, CARNEGIE CON-
FERENCE PAPER No. 95,,SECOND CARNEGIE INQUIRY INTO POVERTY AND DEVELOPMENT
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (1984); Wedepohl, Illiteracy and Adult Basic Education in
South Africa, CARNEGIE CONFERENCE PAPER No. 263, SECOND CARNEGIE INQUIRY
INTO POVERTY AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (1984).
239 For further discussions of the pass laws, see Chaskalson & Duncan, Influx
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derly urbanization" now operate to prohibit rural Africans from
entering urban areas to seek legal aid.z4° Even those blacks who work
in urban areas may not have time to visit the offices because the
offices are open only during working hours. Similarly, those who
work in urban areas but have lengthy commutes to their homes outside
the cities may not have time to visit the urban offices.
Those who overcome all of these problems and make their way to
legal aid offices may still be unsuccessful in procuring aid because
of the rigid application of the means test and its low income ceilings. 241
The system only protects the poorest of the poor. As presently
constituted, the test is not tied to the cost of living index, and thus,
income qualifications do not keep pace with inflation. Moreover, the
system does nothing to assist those poor individuals with income just
above the ceiling level who, because of rising inflation and the pro-
hibitive costs of private legal services, are unable to engage a lawyer.
Since the ceiling figures, unlike flexible guidelines, are absolute levels
of income which must be reevaluated constantly because of changing
economic conditions, there is the danger that disputes over the proper
figure will become ends in themselves and obscure what is arguably
the fundamental principle behind the ceiling figures, namely, that
they are but a means toward the end of providing legal services to
those unable to pay for them. The inflexible means test also does
not consider variations in the economic situation in different areas
of the country. Thus, it compares unfavorably with the 1962 plan
under which each local legal aid committee established a means test
for its particular area and varied its test as it deemed necessary. 242
It is a combination of all the legal system's difficulties described
above that has resulted in the system's gross underutilization. The
underutilization is worse in criminal cases, the area in which an
Control: The Pass Laws, CARNEGIE CONFERENCE PAPER No. 81, SECOND CARNEGIE
INQUIRY INTO POVERTY AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (1984); Zille, Political
Power and Poverty: An Examination of the Role and Effect of Influx Control in
South Africa, CARNEGIE CONFERENCE PAPER No. 83, SECOND CARNEGIE INQUIRY
INTO POVERTY AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (1984).
240 On orderly urbanization, see Schoombee & Davis, Abolishing Influx Control-
Fundamental or Cosmetic Change?, 2 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 208 (1986).
241 By 1976, the income ceiling figures for all population groups were above the
poverty datum line for all racial groups. The Legal Aid Board published figures
indicating that the income ceiling figures averaged three times the minimum income
requirements and twice the standard of living index for blacks. 1976 LEGAL ArD
BOARD REPORT 5 (1977). See supra notes 156-65 and accompanying text.
242 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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indigent who may be threatened with loss of liberty needs assistance
most. Since the implementation of the legal aid system in 1971, the
number of applicants for legal aid has increased annually; 243 while
there were 5,401 applicants of all races in 1971-72,24 by 1983-84 the
figure had risen to 51,305 .245 While only ten percent of all applications
are in criminal matters,246 the number of such applications has in-
creased from ninety-six in 1971-72247 to 5,898 in 1983-84.248 Other
than in Supreme Court cases, where virtually all applicants have
representation, 249 it appears that less than ten percent of the accused
have representation.250
A comparison of the annual number of criminal legal aid applicants
with the number of criminal cases in the magistrates' courts and with
the annual number of sentenced prisoners reveals that the system is
having little success in assisting the indigent accused. In 1971-72, the
figure of ninety-six criminal legal aid applicants 25' compared unfa-
vorably with the 1,481,972 criminal cases in magistrates' courts25 2 and
the 440,922 sentenced prisoners that year.253 By 1984-85, the number
of criminal legal aid applicants was 5,454254 but that figure was
nowhere near the 2,224,382 criminal cases in magistrates' courts25
and the 91,225 sentenced prisoners that year. 2 6 Moreover, the figures
for criminal legal aid applicants include applications by members of
all racial groups. The situation appears especially dismal for Africans
who constitute the vast majority of the South African poor and
71.9% of the South African population. 25 7
Until 1976-77, the number of applications from white, Coloured,
and Asian applicants in criminal matters exceeded the number from
241 1971-84 LEGAL AID BOARD REPORTS, STATISTICS Section (1972-85).
244 1971 LEGAL AID BOARD REPORT (1972).
245 1984 LEGAL AID BOARD REPORT 9 (1985).
246 1969-85 LEGAL AID BoARD REPORTS, STATISTICS Section (1972-85).
247 1972 LEGAL AID BOARD REPORT 4 (1973).
141 1984 LEGAL AID BoARD REPORT 9 (1985).
249 D. MCQUOID-MASON, supra note 8, at 59.
110 Id. at 83.
2,, 1972 LEGAL AD BOARD REPORT 4 (1973).
252 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1972 ANNUAL REPORT
23 (1973).
253 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, COMMISSIONER OF PRISONS 1972 ANNUAL REPORT
(1973).
254 1984 LEGAL AID BOARD REPORT 9 (1985).
25 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1984-85 ANNUAL REPORT
100 (1986).
216 Id. at Table 7.
257 See supra text accompanying note 2.
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Africans. 2 8 In that year, the number of African applicants exceeded
the number of applicants from other racial groups, 25 9 although this
trend has not continued. From 1976 to 1984, the number of African
applicants nearly quadrupled from 541 to 1,961 while the number of
white applicants almost tripled from 483 to 1,443 .26 This represented
a decline for whites from 32.50 of the total to 24.40%o.261 Despite
the increase in the number of African applicants, however, the per-
centage of Africans using the system did not increase correspondingly
to the white decrease. Rather, the proportion of African applicants
actually decreased slightly from 36.90o to 33.20%0.262 Instead, the 1976-
84 period saw an increase in the number of Coloured and Asian
applicants from 310o during 1976-77 to 420%a during 1983-84263 as the
number of applicants more than quintrupled from 462 to 2,494.26
This increase among Coloured applicants resulted from the opening
of a legal aid office in Athlone, a Coloured area, making legal aid
more accessible to the Coloured population in the area.
In relation to the average daily numbers of sentenced and un-
sentenced prisoners, the percentage of African legal aid applicants is
far below their proportional representation in the prison population.
Conversely, in relation to this daily average, the percentage of white,
Coloured, and Asian applicants is far above their proportional re-
presentations in the prison population. For example, in 1983-84,
Africans comprised 72.8%0o of the daily average of sentenced and
unsentenced prisoners265 but only 33.20%a of criminal legal aid appli-
cants. 266 Whites, however, comprised 24.40%a of criminal legal aid
applicants267 but only 4.30o of the daily average of sentenced and
unsentenced prisoners. 26 Similarly, Coloureds and Asians formed 420a
258 1969-77 LEGAL AID BOARD REPORTS, STATISTICS Section (1970-78).
259 1977 LEGAL AID BoARD REPORT 9 (1978).
260 1977-84 LEGAL AD BOARD REPORTS, STATISTICS Section (1978-85).
26, Percentages calculated from id.
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 1977-84 LEGAL AID BOARD REPORTS, STATISTICS Section (1978-85). Percentages
calculated from id.
265 Figure computed from statistics in REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE 1983-84 ANNUAL REPORT, Table 8 (1985).
266 Percentages calculated from 1983-84 LEGAL AID BOARD REPORT, STATISTICS
Section (1985).
267 Id.
268 Figure computed from statistics in REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE 1983-84 ANNUAL REPORT, Table 8 (1985).
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of criminal legal aid applicants269 but only 22.9% of the prison
population. 270
The Legal Aid Board, in keeping with its negative bias toward
legal aid, does not appear disturbed by this situation. It maintains
that because there are large numbers of applicants for aid in civil
cases, it is apparent that "the scheme is not unknown to the general
public." ' 271 The Board argues that the system is "publicized as widely
as possible," and that the Board is "not empowered to force its
services upon accused persons. ' 272 While acknowledging that there
are few applicants for aid in criminal cases, the Board claims that
the low number of such applicants does not result from the system's
rules or practical problems. 273 In the case of Africans, the Board
suggests that their failure to use the system in large numbers derives
from the fact that they generally collect monies from family members
and "are apparently reluctant to accept services free of charge. ' 274
Thus, the Board shows no sign of acting to improve the system's
effectiveness in the near future. The state-funded system, unfortu-
nately, is the major source of legal aid in South Africa, and while
various independent organizations also supply legal aid to the indigent
accused, none has the resources to do much to alleviate the situation.
C. Independent Legal Aid Organizations Described and Evaluated
The efforts of the legal aid organizations existing outside of the
1969 scheme which offer aid to the indigent accused are, at best,
piecemeal attempts to achieve a measure of equality between rich
and poor in criminal cases. The organizations involved are the uni-
versity-sponsored legal aid clinics, the Black Sash, the South African
Council of Churches, and the Legal Resources Center.
269 Percentages calculated from 1983-84 LEGAL AID BOARD REPORT, STATISTICS
Section (1985).
270 Figure computed from statistics in REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE 1983-84 ANNUAL REPORT, Table 8 (1985).
27, Figure computed from statistics in REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE 1983-84 ANNUAL REPORT, Table 8 (1985). The Board denies the allegation
of the Theron Commission of Inquiry into Matters Relating to the Coloured Group
that its services "benefit only a small number of accused persons." REPORT OF THE
THERON COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO MATTERS RELATING TO THE COLOURED GROUP,
para. 45 (1976). The commission of inquiry is a device used by the South African
government to explore matters of national concern. Members of such commissions
are appointed by the Executive. Judges frequently head commissions.
272 1976-77 LEGAL AID BOARD REPORT 6 (1976).
273 Id.
274 1975-76 LEGAL AID BOARD REPORT 6 (1976).
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i. University-Sponsored Legal Aid Clinics
By 1981, several South African universities had established legal
aid clinics. 275 Each clinic has its own mode of operating; however,
all appear to suffer from common problems that have reduced their
effectiveness, namely, a lack of student interest (partly caused by a
lack of academic credit for clinic work), minimal financing from the
student governments, the Universities, and the local law societies,
and a lack of faculty members or other qualified practitioners to
supervise the clinics' activities on a full-time basis. The number of
cases handled by the clinics is small with the majority involving civil
matters. For example, in 1979 Rhodes University handled seventy-
six cases of which only five involved criminal matters. 276 That same
year the University of Zululand legal aid clinic dealt with fifty-six
cases none of which concerned criminal matters.
277
ii. The Black Sash
The Black Sash 278 operates offices in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Port
Elizabeth, Durban, Grahamstown, and Athlone (operated jointly with
the South African Institute of Race Relations).2 79 The offices, which
function essentially for Africans, offer legal advice and, unfortunately
for the accused, deal primarily with civil matters such as housing,
labor and pension problems. However, the offices often refer ap-
plicants in need of a lawyer to the national legal aid scheme.
iii. The Johannesburg Legal Aid Bureau
The Bureau, founded in 1937, continued to operate after the gov-
ernment withdrew its funding in 1961 .2 0 It functions on donations
2 These were the universities of Cape Town (1972), the Witwatersrand (1973),
Natal (Durban (1973) and Pietermaritzburg (1974)), Port Elizabeth (1974), Stellen-
bosch (1975), the Western Cape (1975), Durban-Westville (1976), Zululand (1978),
Rhodes (1979), Pretoria (1980), the North (1980), and Rand Afrikaans University
(1981). D. McQuoID-MAsoN, supra note 8, at 139. The clinic at the University of
Durban-Westville closed in 1981. Id. at 159. For a fuller discussion of the work of
the university clinics, see id. at 139-64; M. SLABBERT, supra note 4, at 15-21.
276 D. MCQUOID-MASON, supra note 8, at 147.
27 Id. at 160.
278 The Black Sash is an organization of women established in the 1950s to protest
the Senate Act which led to the removal of the Coloured voters in the Cape from
the common roll. After Parliament passed the Senate Act, the Sash protested other
repressive legislation. L. THOMPSON & A. PRIOR, supra note 2, at 165. See generally
C. MICHELMAN, THE BLACK SASH OF SOUTH AFRICA: A CASE STUDY IN LIBERACISM
(1975).
279 See D. McQUOID-MASON supra note 8, at 133-36; M. SLABBERT, supra note 4,
at 21-22.
280 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. See generally D. McQuoID-MASON,
supra note 8, at 128-33; M. SLABBERT, supra note 4, at 23-24.
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and is chronically short of money. Staff members must engage in
fund-raising activities to prevent the Bureau from closing. Lawyers
who offer their services to the Bureau do so on a pro amico basis.
Some sixty percent of the Bureau's work involves giving advice.2"'
The remaining forty percent involves mostly civil matters. 2 2 In 1980,
the Bureau handled 773 civil cases as opposed to 130 criminal cases. 283
iv. The South African Council of Churches
The South African Council of Churches (SACC) offers legal advice
to political prisoners through offices in Cape Town, Johannesburg,
Durban, East London, Pertermartizburg, Port Elizabeth, Pretoria,
and Queenstown. 28 4 It has established the Asingeni Relief Fund which
provides financial assistance for the defense of individuals charged
with contravening security legislation.2 5 The Fund also has provided
for the defense of people charged with violating the Group Areas
Act,2 6 as well as for those accused of violating influx control laws. 28 7
As a result of these activities, the SACC incurred the wrath of the
South African government, which historically has disapproved of aid
in politically sensitive cases.28
Consequently, the SACC became the subject of an investigation
by the Eloff Commission of Inquiry which examined its organization
and finances for the years 1975-81, a period during which more than
ninety-seven percent of the SACC's funds came from foreign do-
nors. 28 9 Chaired by Mr. Justice C.F. Eloff, the Commission was an
281 D. MCQUOID-MASON, supra note 8, at 129, 131.
282 Id. at 131.
283 Compare id. at 130, Table 50 (773 civil cases in 1980) with id. at 312, Table
52 (130 criminal cases in 1980).
284 M. SLABBERT, supra note 4, at 24.
285 SURv. RACE REL. S. AFR. 103 (1979).
286 The Group Areas Act of 1950 as amended divides all urban areas into racial
zones. Only the members of a particular racial group may live or conduct business
in its designated area. The effect of this legislation has been the forcible uprooting
of thousands of African, Couloured, and Asian families. L. THOMPSON & A. PRIOR,
supra note 2, at 67-68.
287 SURV. RACE REL. S. AFR. 103 (1979).
288 See supra notes 92-93, 109, 203 and accompanying text.
289 From 1975 to 1981, the SACC's income was R17,958,048. Most of the money
came from foreign church organizations. Some 52.6% of the funds came from West
German donors, 10.3% from the World Council of Churches, 6% from the Neth-
erlands donors, 5.2% from donors in Switzerland, 4.4% from donors in Denmark,
3.5% from donors in the United Kingdom, and 1.2% from donors in Canada. Other
foreign donations came from Norway, Finland, "multinational sources, other small
foreign sources, and sundry sources (local and foreign)." Local sources accounted
for only 1.2% (R209,853) of the income from donations over the seven years. Rand
Daily Mail, Feb. 16, 1984, at 9, col. 2.
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all-white body29° appointed by the Prime Minister in 1981; no theo-
logians were members. 29' The Commission could have declared the
SACC an "affected organization" under South African security laws.
Such a finding would have barred any foreign financial contributions,
thereby adversely affecting or perhaps closing down most of the
SACC's programs, including its legal aid services.
After hearing evidence that filled eighty-two volumes and delib-
erating for five months, the Commission published a 450-page report
in February 1984.292 The Report accused the SACC of "strategies of
resistance to the government ' 29 and castigated the SACC's legal aid
work. It argued that although a large portion of the Council's funds
from 1975-81 were spent on legal defense, "a relatively small number
of persons, save the lawyers concerned, benefitted by the activities
of the SACC in this regard. ' 294 While the Report stopped short of
calling for a complete ban on foreign contributions to the SACC, it
did call for government controls on the SACC's financing by making
it subject to a law controlling donations to welfare organizations. 295
How this will affect the SACC's current activities is not clear. It is
not unrealistic, however, to suggest that in the future the government
may pass legislation restricting the SACC's legal aid operations. As
Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu has noted, "they [the govern-
ment] have not been known to be bashful about passing new legislation
to deal with awkward customers." 296
v. The Legal Resources Center
Founded in 1979, the Legal Resources Center is a public interest
law firm modeled on both the American public interest law firm and
the English neighborhood law office. 297 With offices in Durban and
Cape Town, which advise Africans, Asians, and Coloureds on civil
and criminal matters, it also operates a law clinic and oversees the
operation of three law clinics at the University of the Witwatersrand.
290 The membership of the SACC is approximately eighty percent black. Sowetan,
Feb. 16, 1984, at 7, col. 1.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 World of Religion, Feb. 25, 1984.
294 Sowetan, Feb. 16, 1984, at 6, col. 1.
293 World of Religion, Feb. 25, 1984.
296 Rand Daily Mail, Feb. 16, 1984, at 8, col. 1.
297 For a further discussion, see D. MCQuOID-MASON, supra note 8, at 126-28;
M. SLABBERT, supra note 4, at 13-14.
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The Center was responsible for the important Koman 29 and Rikhotto299
test cases which made it easier for Africans to acquire residence rights
in cities. Although the Center deals with some criminal problems,
most of its work involves civil matters such as consumer problems,
workmen's compensation claims, housing, and wrongful dismissals
from employment.
While the above-described efforts provide some assistance to the
indigent criminally accused, they do little to improve the overall
situation.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
The inadequacy of the services offered by the independent organ-
izations and the failure of the National Legal Aid scheme present a
difficult situation for those interested in achieving adequate repre-
sentation for the indigent accused. Three possible paths for legal aid
present themselves: 1) all efforts (state-supported and otherwise) could
be abandoned entirely; 2) the system could be retained in its present
form; 3) the system could be reformed to ensure that a more equitable
distribution of legal services to indigents (especially in criminal cases)
is achieved. The first possibility appeals to those extreme conservatives
who believe that legal aid is unnecessary, as well as to those radicals
who oppose legal aid on the grounds that its absence will heighten
the contradictions within the society and hasten the revolution. The
views of the former group should be rejected on the grounds that
access to representation, at least to some degree, equals access to
justice. The views of the latter group are more problematic. Admit-
tedly, where, as in South Africa, the legal structures underpinning
poverty (and other forms of inequality) are oppressive, a legion of
lawyers representing the poor will not bring an end to poverty. Indeed,
it is naive to place legal representation at the center of any strategy
for an attack on poverty. Yet, farsighted concerns about hastening
the revolution can be of little comfort to an indigent African faced
with a criminal prosecution. The second possibility must be rejected,
for as has been demonstrated, the current system does little to meet
present needs. Thus, for those interested in achieving adequate rep-
298 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
299 Rikhotto v. East Rand Administration Board held that a contract worker who
returns to his rural home for a brief time each year, as required by law, is able to
acquire an urban residence right after ten years of continuous employment. Dugard,
Using the Law to Pervert Justice, 11:2 HuMAN RIGHTS 12 (1983).
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resentation, the third possibility is the only viable alternative.
In keeping with this premise, it is proposed that the current na-
tionally-financed system be revised to serve a larger number of in-
dividuals and that its operations be harmonized with those of the
non-state-funded organizations. Such a revision entails changing the
Act, the Guide, and the system's mode of operation in order to
create a decentralized scheme responsive to local needs, funded by
the state, controlled by the legal profession, and administered by
legal aid officers who are employed by the Board itself, rather than
by the Department of Justice or the Department of Bantu Admin-
istration. The utility of this proposed revision is applicable not only
under present circumstances but also in a majority-ruled South Africa
in which, despite a more equitable political dispensation, poverty will
not disappear overnight.
A. The Act
In order to remove the perception of the Board as a mere arm of
the state, the legal profession should be given more control over the
legal aid scheme. This increased control might also have the effect
of stimulating the profession's interest in the system. Greater control
can be achieved in two ways. First, the Act's provision concerning
the make-up of the Board3°° should be revised to give the legal
profession more representation. Second, the provisions of the Act
giving the Minister of Justice broad powers in appointment and
possible termination of members30 1 should be abandoned. Instead,
the local bar councils and Provincial Law Societies should have the
freedom to appoint their representatives without the Minister's ap-
proval. The Act also should curtail the Minister's powers of removal
over representatives from the Bar by establishing a list of objective
criteria for removal, and by requiring the consent or, at least, the
consultation of the relevant professional organization before the Min-
ister takes dismissal action. Such a provision would be in marked
contrast to the present subjective criterion of "good reasons." 30 2 The
independence created by a greater degree of control and a reduced
potential for removal would free the Board to abandon its present
conservative stance and to take on cases of a more politically sensitive
nature.
0 Legal Aid Act No. 22 of 1969, supra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
30I Legal Aid Act No. 22 of 1969, supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text.
302 Legal Aid Act No. 22 of 1969, supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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To help promote the impression that the Board functions inde-
pendently, the Act should include a provision establishing a separate
monitoring organization responsible for reviewing the Board's action
and submitting reports to Parliament at regular intervals. Members
of the monitoring organization would include prominent members of
the bar as well as laypersons; such an organization might be modeled
after the Lord Chancellor's Advisory Committee in the United King-
dom, 3 °3 criteria for membership in which are knowledge of the court's
work and an understanding of social conditions. This Committee's
reports provide constructive criticism, stimulate reflection on the legal
aid system's operations and put such operations in a social context.
This last contribution is particularly valuable as it helps to prevent
practitioners intimately involved with the system from forgetting the
social functions of legal aid, and adopting too legalistic an approach.
B. The Guide
As has been noted, the Guide evidences a negative attitude toward
legal aid. Provisions reflecting this attitude must be removed. These
include the provision warning legal aid officers to be on their guard
against abuses of the system, which introduces a high level of suspicion
into the application process,0 and the vague criteria which allow the
legal aid officer to refuse aid because of his own personal prejudices. 5
The latter should be replaced by objective criteria which would work
to eliminate potential abuses by legal aid officers. A statement of
the theoretical principles of equality and justice which inform the
rendering of legal aid should replace all such negative provisions.
The provisions dealing specifically with legal aid in criminal cases
also must be revised to ensure equality of representation between
rich and poor. Thus, the Guide should eliminate current pro deo
practice' °6 and instead make legal aid available to all indigents accused
of crimes. Such a provision would result in the appointment of
attorney-assisted defense counsel in all cases; therefore, the standard
of legal services would improve in those cases where the best assistance
is needed, i.e. those in which the accused risks losing his life. Indeed,
statistics indicate that the impact of such a change would be con-
303 Zander, Legal Aid in a Democratic Society, in LEGAL AID IN SOUTH AFRICA,
supra note 79, at 20.
104 See supra text accompanying note 68.
305 See supra notes 169, 207-10 and accompanying text.
306 See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
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siderable. For example, for the period May 1, 1981 to April 30, 1982,
the General Council of the Bar of South Africa reported that 2,394
pro deo counsel received appointments in the various divisions of the
Supreme Court. 07 Compared with figures supplied by the Legal Aid
Board for the same period, pro deo advocates constitute approxi-
mately 567o of all counsel funded by the state. 08
The Guide's provision limiting legal aid in cases involving motor
vehicle offenses to exceptional circumstances3 9 should be modified.
While the intent of the provision is to limit the availability of legal
aid to incidents of a serious nature,310 the practical effect is the denial
of aid in serious cases such as reckless driving or culpable homicide.
A more equitable position would be to provide aid in cases where
the accused faces incarceration or, at the very least, in cases where
the accused is subject to imprisonment beyond a certain period of
time, e.g. one year.3"
C. The System In Practice
Turning from revision of the tone and language of the Guide to
the working of the system in practice, it appears that decentralization
would result in an efficient system that is more responsive to the
needs of the poor. As has been demonstrated, the Board is under-
financed, and what financing it does receive is spent inefficiently. 312
With regard to financing, the Government should increase the amount
spent per capita to at least reach parity with western nations such
as Canada and the United Kingdom.313 Even though the state has
historically taken a negative attitude toward legal aid-the Department
of Justice has never repudiated its statements denigrating the value
of legal aid3 4-two arguments likely to appeal to the state can be
made. First, placing the level of financing on a par with that in the
West will serve to deflect foreign criticism away from the present
inequality of representation. Since in general the South African gov-
ernment seems particularly interested in cultivating a positive image
307 ANN. SURV. S. AFR. L. 505 (1982).
308 Id.
309 See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
310 See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
-, Providing aid in cases where the accused faces imprisonment is the postion in
the United States. See supra text accompanying note 106.
3,2 See supra notes 220-30 and accompanying text.
3,3 See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
3,4 See supra notes 108, 110-18 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 18:239286
LEGAL AID IN SOUTH AFRICA
abroad,315 it may find this argument attractive. Second, increasing
the amount spent on legal aid would result in a savings of money
spent on imprisonment.116 For example, the acquittal rate for rep-
resented accused is thirty-five percent.3 17 The cost of keeping one
person incarcerated was R8 per diem by 1984-85.318 Assuming an
acquittal rate of thirty-five percent as a result of legal aid for the
87,966 prisoners given sentences of up to one month in 1984-85 (i.e.
27,288)119 and assuming further that the average length of sentence
imposed on these persons was fifteen days, at a rate of R8 per person
per day, acquittal because of legal aid would save R3.275 million
(27,288 x R8 x 15). Using the same rate for acquittals, it appears
that the savings increase with the length of the avoided prison term.
Thus, if 35% of the 76,348 persons sentenced to imprisonment for
over one month and up to four months in 1978-79320 were acquitted
because of legal aid (i.e. 26,722) and assuming that they would have
served an average sentence of sixty days, the amount of money saved
would equal R12.827 million (26,722 x R8 x 60). In practice the
amount saved by legal aid would be higher still, because these figures
represent only the amount saved in cases where non-custodial sen-
tences are imposed. Presumably, with legal aid, the number of non-
custodial sentences also would increase and would thereby contribute
to further savings.
The system must also use the resources it receives more efficiently
so that the maximum numlber of people can be benefitted. The Board
should, therefore, abandon the referral system in favor of an in-
house system of salaried lawyers. As mentioned previously,3 21 the
referral system is approximately three times as costly as an in-house
system. Thus, for the same amount of money, in-house lawyers could
handle approximately three times as many cases as referral lawyers
under the present system. Beyond the purely monetary benefits of
an in-house system there is the additional advantage that such lawyers
would acquire expertise in the areas of law most frequently involving
"I See L. THOMPSON & A. PRIOR, supra note 2, at 147-48.
36 This hypothetical follows D. McQuoID-MAsoN, supra note 8, at 110-11.
i,' See M. SLABBERT, supra note 4, at 30.
3, This figure is derived from REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
1984-85 ANNUAL REPORT,. TABLES 1, 8 (1986).
119 Id. at Table 9.
320 Id.
32 See supra notes 226-30 and accompanying text.
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the indigent; this expertise also would render such lawyers more
competent in their work than general practitioners.
As under the present system where indigents closely identify the
Board with the state,3 22 however, it is also likely that indigents would
view in-house lawyers in the same manner. To prevent such an
impression from arising, once the profession has greater control of
the Board as suggested above, it should move to decentralize the
system by allowing the Provincial Law Societies to take control of
the day-to-day operations of the system. Arguably, such a change
would give greater flexibility in administration and would create a
more ambient understanding of the nature of local problems. The
new system would operate as follows: in each province, the Provincial
Law Society would be responsible for the operation of legal aid in
its area and would appoint a provincial legal aid committee which
would oversee the day-to-day operations of the system and submit
an annual report to both the Provincial Law Society and the National
Legal Aid Board. Provincial legal aid committees could model them-
selves on the Area Committees used in the United Kingdom . 23 Thus,
they would include practicing attorneys and advocates nominated by
local bar councils. Some provision should be made to ensure rep-
resentation by both black and white practitioners.3 24 Conceivably, this
would raise the committees' esteem in the public's eye. The provincial
legal aid committees also should include members of the local Uni-
versity law faculty to foster greater cooperation and communication
between the National Legal Aid Scheme and the University law clinics.
The provincial legal aid committees would then hire local attorneys
and advocates to handle cases. While it is normally not the practice
for law offices in South Africa to include both attorneys and ad-
vocates, special permission could be obtained from the organized legal
profession. Indeed, such permission already has been granted to the
Legal Resources Center.3 25
The committees should actively seek to employ black, especially
African, practitioners as this also would contribute to the legal aid
322 See supra notes 196-203 and accompanying text.
323 E. MATTHEWS & A. OULTON, supra note 303, at ch. 1.
324 There are 4,600 attorneys in South Africa of whom 250 are blacks. Additionally,
there are 600 advocates of whom 20 are black. Of the 20 black advocates, only
nine are African. Correspondence from the Black Lawyers Association of South
Africa, Legal Services and Law Reform in the United States: Are There Lessons
Applicable to Rural South Africa?, New York, N.Y., (June 10, 1985) (Carnegie
Corporation Conference).
32 Dugard, supra note 299, at 22.
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system's positive public image and attract more black (especially
African) clients who because of cultural and linguistic reasons cur-
rently hesitate or are unable to use the system. Presumably, individuals
might communicate not only more easily but also more willingly,
with members of the same ethnic group. To further facilitate com-
munication with poor Africans, the committees might also employ
African interpreters to assist clients. Since local committees would
control the scheme, they would have an appreciation of which in-
terpreters to hire, based on their knowledge of local needs. The
committees might also offer fellowships to recent black law graduates
to work in their offices and might establish agreements with local
law faculties offering academic credit to students who interned with
the committees. These moves would give young black lawyers ex-
perience in areas of the law they will encounter in practice and would
foster greater interest in legal aid work among law students. This
last move also would have positive effects later, as these law students,
many of whom presumably would become sympathetic to legal aid
and have a greater appreciation of the legal needs of the poor, enter
practice and eventually become prominent members of the bar.
In order to further dispel the impression that the legal aid system
is an arm of the state, the provincial legal aid committees should be
responsible for hiring their own legal aid officers rather than having
legal aid officers who are employees of the Department of Justice
or the Department of Bantu Administration, as is presently the case.
The same consideration of ethnic, cultural, and linguistic background
applied in the selection of legal practitioners also should apply to
these officers. Ideally, such officers should be drawn from the areas
in which they will serve, as this will ensure that they have the greatest
possible understanding of local problems. Again, as was suggested
for clients, interpreters employed by the committees would be available
to facilitate communication with poor Africans.
The decentralization proposed here would improve the quality and
quantity of legal aid in ways other than those just articulated. For
example, since each provincial legal aid committee would be intimately
aware of the problems peculiar to those indigent in its geographic
area, it might open offices in areas which the present system with
its offices in downtown metropolitan locations ignores. Thus, in an
effort to better serve the people in its area, it might open offices in
African townships and in rural areas. As noted above, the opening
of a legal aid office in Athlone, a Coloured area, made legal aid
more accessible to the population there and resulted in an increase
19881
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in the number of Coloured applicants.3 26 It is fair to speculate, based
on this development, that the opening of legal aid offices in the
major African townships such as Soweto would result in a similar
rise in the number of African applicants. Offices also might adopt
working hours compatible with the schedules of those in the areas
they serve. Hence, unlike under the present system, offices might be
open early in the morning, late in the evening, and on weekends.
Decentralization also would lead to a greater number of applicants
being accepted for legal aid. Flexible local means tests should replace
the rigid national standard. Rather than an absolute figure above
which an applicant may not receive aid,327 local tests should take the
form of mere guidelines based upon considerations of local economic
conditions; the tests should be tied to the cost of living index so that
income qualifications keep pace with inflation. 28 Legal aid officers
familiar with local conditions would then be at liberty to consider
each case on its merits and decide accordingly. Moreover, in cases
where officers deny legal aid, the local committees should require
them to give written reasons. These reasons should be objective;
"good cause ' 3 29 should be considered an unsatisfactory reason. This
would facilitate the appeal process which itself would become more
sympathetic to indigents' requests under a decentralized system. For
example, appeals no longer would be to the National Director in
Pretoria, 30 but rather to the director of the provincial committee
who presumably would be drawn from the ranks of the provincial
legal aid society and elected by its members. This director could be
assumed to have a greater understanding of local circumstances that
might make the rendering of aid in a particular case appropriate;
the National Director under the present system could not be expected
to be acquainted with local problems in all of South Africa. Thus,
with a local appeals process, the number of those eventually granted
aid conceivably would increase.
Decentralization also would lead to more effective publicization of
the scheme; this would result in an increased number of people seeking
326 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
327 See supra notes 156-65 and accompanying text.
328 See supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the effects
of inflation on the poor in South Africa, see Kahn, The Effects of Inflation on the
Poor in South Africa, CARNEGIE CONFERENCE PAPER No. 134, SECOND CARNEGIE
INQUIRY INTO POVERTY AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA (1984).
329 See supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
330 See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
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aid. As has been noted, the current system has an anti-publicity bias
and does not spend money on advertising but rather relies on free
services of the media and other organizations.331 Ideally, the funds
should be allocated specifically for advertising. Indeed, funding for
the entire system might be arranged through an annual process whereby
each local committee would submit a proposed budget to the National
Legal Aid Committee which in turn would forward the requests to
the government. Such budgets might contain specific requests for
advertising in addition to requests for salaries and other operating
expenses. Under a decentralized system, each local committee might
spend its advertising funds in a manner which, after considering local
conditions, it deemed would have the greatest impact in attracting
indigent applicants. Thus, for example, it might advertise in news-
papers with a large African readership.
Even in the absence of funds for advertising, local committees
could disseminate information about the legal aid scheme, thereby
attracting clients more effectively than the National Legal Aid Board
does under the present system. They could establish close ties with
other non-state sponsored legal aid organizations such as the Black
Sash and the university law clinics. The Sash, which already sends
those needing representation to the Legal Aid Board offices, might
also post information and distribute pamphlets in its own offices.
Students at university law clinics could be required to man legal aid
information offices in magistrates' and other courts; they also could
run information and advice bureaus located in areas where the local
legal aid committees determine the need is greatest. Such links with
information and advice offices would establish a regular means of
directing needy clients toward the legal aid offices.
Legal aid ties with the churches figure prominently, as well, in
improving the dissemination of information about legal aid. They
could make their parishioners aware of both the manner in which
the system operates and of any revisions in procedures as they occur.
They could notify parishioners of the existence and operations of
non-state funded legal. aid organizations such as the Black Sash, the
university law clinics, and the proposed information and advice of-
fices, all of which would have the added function of funneling indigent
clients toward the local legal aid committee offices.
13, See supra notes 231-36 and accompanying text.
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The changes suggested here would contribute to the system's greater
utilization and thereby would ensure a more equitable distribution
of legal aid to the indigent accused.
CONCLUSION
Although South Africa recognizes the right to counsel in criminal
cases, that right has little value in a country where the vast majority
of people cannot afford legal representation. The existence of the
right, nevertheless, is a prerequisite for creating a system of legal aid
that ensures a measure of equality of representation between rich
and poor alike. Unfortunately, the South African government his-
torically has taken a negative attitude toward legal aid. This has
produced a national legal aid system that is ineffective in supplying
legal assistance to indigents, underfinanced, underpublicized, and
underutilized. The various independent organizations that supply legal
aid to the indigent accused have neither the finances nor the manpower
to ameliorate the situation.
In order to achieve adequate representation for the indigent accused,
the current nationally-financed system must be revised to serve a
greater number of individuals and its operations must be harmonized
with those of the independent organizations. Such a revision entails
changing the Legal Aid Act, the Legal Aid Guide, and the system's
mode of operation in order to create a decentralized scheme responsive
to local needs, funded by the state, controlled by the legal profession,
and administered by legal aid officers who are employed by the Legal
Aid Board itself. While such changes would not end the problems
of the indigent accused-these must be resolved through social and
economic changes in South African society as well as through leg-
islation-they would, at least, improve their lot.
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